Why Is Strategy So Difficult?

The Atlantic | Eliot A. Cohen

United States military operations against Iran in 2026 encountered severe strategic setbacks despite America's technological superiority, decades of regional presence, and support from Israel, Great Britain, and Gulf partners. Iranian forces continue throttling the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrating how tactical advantages fail without sound strategic alignment. Washington neglected crucial geopolitical contextual dynamics prior to initiating hostilities.

The US alienated European allies needed to counter mine and surface naval threats while failing to prepare Gulf partners for retaliation. Simultaneously, American planners underestimated Chinese and Russian targeting intelligence and weapons transfers supporting Tehran. Although intelligence apparatuses effectively track quantifiable assets such as tanks, missiles, and warships, they fail to evaluate qualitative adversary motivations and broader alignment dynamics. Strategy remains acutely difficult. This operational breakdown reveals how technical dominance cannot compensate for systemic misjudgments regarding coalition cohesion, proxy alignments, and adversary resilience in contemporary regional conflicts.

Comment

Quantitative order-of-battle intelligence collected by the Defense Intelligence Agency excels at counting physical platforms but frequently fails to assess qualitative adversary alignment. In sea-denial operations across the Strait of Hormuz, tracking Iranian missile launchers provided negligible insight into Russian targeting feeds assisting Tehran. United States Central Command consequently structured strike options against an isolated adversary rather than a networked intelligence architecture.

As a second-order consequence, offensive strikes using AGM-158C LRASM munitions risk misdirection against tactical launchers while leaving strategic intelligence-sharing nodes intact. Defensive screening by US Navy carrier strike groups remains perpetually vulnerable when Iranian anti-ship batteries receive real-time satellite telemetry from external partners. Fifth Fleet defensive operations across the Strait of Hormuz consequently suffer systemic degradation if counter-targeting efforts focus exclusively on localized firing units.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Fifth Fleet strike planning relies primarily on quantitative order-of-battle metrics from the Defense Intelligence Agency, how can operational commanders effectively counter adversary anti-ship batteries that rely on external satellite targeting feeds?

The available evidence points toward a structural disconnect between platform-centric target development and multi-domain sensor integration. The pattern suggests that strike campaigns targeting localized launchers in the Strait of Hormuz yield diminishing returns when adversary batteries rely on external intelligence feeds. Consequently, maritime interdiction efficacy depends far more on neutralizing cross-border surveillance networks than on exhausting enemy kinetic munitions inventories.

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