The Scope and Nature of the U.S.-China Competition

RAND Corporation | Michael J. Mazarr, Amanda Kerrigan, Sam Plapinger, Jenna Murray, Gregory Weider Fauerbach, Habiba Ahmed, Benjamin Lenain, Marzia Giambertoni, Trevor Johnston, Tim McDonald, Ashley L. Rhoades, John Chen, Jon Schmid, Kristen Gunness, Stephanie Pezard, Jake Rinaldi, Alexandra Stark, Anne Stickells

The United States Department of War sponsored a comprehensive RAND Corporation study in September 2026 to evaluate the shifting dynamics of the U.S.-China strategic competition. This assessment reveals that while Beijing executes an integrated campaign across multiple sectors of national power, Washington has failed to fully invest in critical statecraft tools.

Historically, this rivalry is driven not by ideological expansionism, but by China's rapid advancements in domestic economics, global institutional influence, and science and technology. Technology remains the primary battleground. To counter these advancements, the report recommends that the United States prioritize homeland resilience, secure global digital and artificial intelligence networks, and strengthen international alliances to constrain Chinese power. Ultimately, success hinges on demonstrating which governance system best serves its citizens during intense global instability, requiring Washington to institute sweeping domestic reforms and develop more efficient governing institutions and strategic approaches.

Comment

The prioritisation of digital networks and artificial intelligence within the Global Competitive Analysis framework signals a shift in modern deterrence. The Office of the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering increasingly treats technological superiority as a prerequisite for structural influence. Networks are now active battlegrounds. Consequently, the integration of dual-use technologies into allied frameworks forms the baseline of contemporary strategic competition.

This technological contest operates primarily through the control of physical infrastructure, such as subsea fibre-optic cables and advanced semiconductor fabrication facilities. By securing these critical nodes, the National Defense Research Institute suggests that coalition partners can restrict adversary access to high-performance computing resources. This targeted denial directly constrains the development of autonomous systems and automated command networks within the People's Liberation Army.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How does the People's Liberation Army's potential adoption of asymmetric software workarounds affect the efficacy of hardware-centric denial strategies within the Global Competitive Analysis framework?

The trajectory indicates that hardware-centric denial remains highly effective in the medium term, as training state-of-the-art military models requires physical silicon that cannot be easily bypassed by software optimisation. However, my assessment is that the People's Liberation Army will increasingly mitigate these constraints by leveraging decentralised computing architectures and open-source algorithmic efficiencies. This shift suggests that hardware denial is a delaying tactic rather than a permanent solution to technological competition.

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