The System, Not the Centrifuges

Small Wars Journal | Rania Kisar

The Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, signed on 17 June 2026 to halt United States-Iran hostilities, collapsed within weeks because it failed to address Tehran's regional proxy networks and ballistic missile capabilities. This diplomatic failure triggered a resumption of military operations on 7 July 2026, leaving the strategic Strait of Hormuz highly vulnerable to maritime coercion.

Historically, Washington has prioritised nuclear containment over regional security dynamics. This narrow focus allowed Iran to build an expansive, asymmetric threat network while nearing the nuclear threshold. Consequently, Gulf capitals now face severe economic blackmail through inflated shipping fees and targeted infrastructure strikes. The conflict remains unresolved. Any future diplomatic settlement that ignores these non-nuclear leverage points will merely reschedule the next military confrontation, leaving exposed partners to bear the immediate operational and financial costs of renewed escalation while Tehran retains its coercive regional leverage.

Comment

The exclusion of Gulf Cooperation Council states from the negotiation of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding reveals a persistent friction in the security architecture of the Persian Gulf. By treating maritime security and nuclear limits as bilateral issues between Washington and Tehran, the framework marginalised the very partners whose critical infrastructure remains most vulnerable to Iranian retaliation. This diplomatic sidelining weakens the credibility of American security guarantees among traditional partners like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

As a direct consequence of this marginalisation, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are increasingly incentivised to pursue independent hedging strategies rather than relying on US-led deterrence initiatives. This shift manifests in Muscat's unilateral mediation efforts over the Strait of Hormuz corridor and Riyadh's diplomatic engagement with Tehran. Ultimately, the collapse of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding accelerates a regional fragmentation that dilutes the effectiveness of future US Central Command operations in the Middle East.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If future diplomatic frameworks replicate the bilateral structure of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, what are the long-term consequences for US Central Command's ability to maintain a unified maritime security coalition in the Strait of Hormuz?

The pattern of unilateral diplomacy suggests that replicating this bilateral structure will likely accelerate the fragmentation of the maritime coalition, as partners like Oman and Saudi Arabia increasingly seek separate security arrangements with Tehran. My assessment is that this shift will reduce the operational footprint of US Central Command in the region, leaving the Strait of Hormuz governed by a patchwork of local bilateral corridors rather than a cohesive international framework. Consequently, the United States will face higher coordination costs and diminished leverage during future maritime crises.

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