Between Iran, Iraq and a hard place: Iraq’s prime minister weighs next moves - analysis

The Jerusalem Post | Seth J. Frantzman

Iraq closed the Mandali border crossing with Iran on 10 November 2026 under intense United States pressure to disrupt Tehran's regional land corridors. However, Baghdad simultaneously reopened the Sheeb crossing, illustrating Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's precarious balancing act between Washington and Tehran. Iraqi forces face over 1,000 Iranian-backed attacks since February 2026.

Zaidi initially aimed to disarm aligned Shi'ite militias by September 2026 following US troop withdrawals, but recalcitrant groups forced an extension to June 2027. Kataib Hezbollah has intensified hostile rhetoric and stands suspected of targeting the Khor Mor gas field in the Kurdistan region to coerce the government. Iran continues installing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officials, including its ambassador, to solidify influence over parliament. Zaidi now deliberates launching an arrest campaign against militia leadership amidst persistent intimidation and economic sabotage. Baghdad faces a decisive crossroads. Failure to assert state authority risks turning Iraq into an unviable proxy battleground.

Comment

The dual chain of command within Iraq's security architecture presents a fundamental structural barrier to state authority. While Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi formally commands the Iraqi Armed Forces, Iranian-backed groups like Kataib Hezbollah operate under a parallel doctrine dictated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force. This institutional bifurcation allows militias to leverage state legitimacy while executing independent strike operations against infrastructure such as the Khor Mor gas field. State sovereignty remains severely compromised as long as non-state formations retain autonomous operational decision-making.

A comparable structural friction emerged during Operation Charge of the Knights in 2008, when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki confronted the Mahdi Army in Basra. That campaign demonstrated that Iraqi state forces can only subordinate rival paramilitaries when central command exercises unified authority over national border security and critical energy infrastructure. Without a similar institutional enforcement mechanism today, militia integration into the official Popular Mobilisation Forces framework serves primarily to shelter illegal strike operations from state oversight.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi refrains from a military enforcement campaign akin to the 2008 Operation Charge of the Knights, what structural mechanisms remain to prevent Kataib Hezbollah from using the Popular Mobilisation Forces framework as leverage over Iraqi energy assets?

The pattern suggests that without direct military enforcement, state authority over critical infrastructure will rely on targeted economic sanctions and selective border management. However, as long as Kataib Hezbollah retains operational autonomy within the Popular Mobilisation Forces, institutional co-optation rather than compliance remains the primary trajectory for militia-state relations in Baghdad.

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