The Role of ASEAN in the South China Sea Disputes

E-International Relations | Leticia Simões

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations faces structural paralysis in mitigating South China Sea territorial disputes due to internal division among its ten member states and persistent diplomatic pressure from Beijing. Four member nations—Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei—maintain overlapping sovereignty claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands against China's extensive nine-dash line claims.

Consensus decision-making limits bloc action. While individual states ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to establish exclusive economic zones, regional conflict resolution mechanisms remain non-binding. The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties lacks enforcement provisions, and negotiations for a binding Code of Conduct have stalled since 1999. Non-claimant ASEAN states prioritize bilateral economic ties with China over collective regional security guarantees. Consequently, Beijing leverages consensus requirements within the regional organization to prevent a unified diplomatic front, leaving claimant states dependent on fragmented bilateral negotiations and unilateral maritime strategies.

Comment

The reliance on non-binding instruments like the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea reveals a fundamental structural gap between international maritime law and regional consensus mechanisms. While UNCLOS provides an explicit statutory framework for 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zones, its dispute adjudication mechanisms depend on state submission to binding jurisdiction. China's rejection of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration award regarding the Philippines' maritime entitlements exposes the limitation of voluntary compliance within regional treaty architecture.

This legal friction forces littoral states to substitute multilateral treaty protections with direct physical domain presence. Consequently, organizations like the Philippine Coast Guard and the Vietnam Coast Guard have expanded surface patrol deployments around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal to assert statutory rights where normative agreements fail.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor exerts greater influence on maritime enforcement strategies around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal — statutory EEZ rights derived from UNCLOS or non-binding diplomatic frameworks like the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties?

The pattern suggests that physical enforcement and statutory EEZ rights under UNCLOS consistently override non-binding diplomatic mechanisms during operational friction. While diplomatic declarations maintain an avenue for dialogue, actual jurisdiction across disputed features relies on continuous surface presence by coast guard and maritime militia vessels. Consequently, non-binding agreements serve primarily as diplomatic management tools rather than effective deterrents against active physical counter-claims.

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