21 November 2026

Uncertain Precedents For Redrawing Russian–Ukrainian Border In Post-Soviet Space – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Paul Goble

Proposals to end Europe's largest war since 1945 by redrawing state and regional borders between Russia and Ukraine draw inspiration from Soviet-era administrative shifts and post-1991 Central Asian territorial swaps. Moscow minuted 90 major inter-republican transfers between 1921 and 1980. Active hostilities distinguish the current conflict from peaceful Central Asian demarcation processes.

Moscow aimed to absorb all Ukrainian territory, while Kyiv seeks a complete return to its pre-2014 borders. Neither side has achieved these objectives. Post-1991 stability has solidified internal administrative divisions into rigid national identities. Veteran organizations and domestic publics in both nations firmly oppose territorial compromises. External mediation attempts offering NATO membership in exchange for land face deep skepticism in Kyiv. Ukrainian citizens remember the unfulfilled security assurances of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and reject proposals engineered without direct participation. Premature external pressure to accept revised boundaries risks hardening political resolve and extending fighting indefinitely.

Comment

The structural fragility of proposed territorial swaps stems from the collapse of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act framework governing European border inviolability. Moscow's formal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts in September 2022 repudiated the legal principle of uti possidetis juris that anchored post-Soviet republic boundaries after 1991. Without a mutually recognized legal baseline between Kyiv and Moscow, any negotiated line of control in Donbas functions as a temporary operational pause rather than a binding international frontier.

This legal ambiguity creates immediate secondary friction for future troop posture along the Dnipro River. NATO signatories considering security commitments for Ukraine would face undefined collective defence triggers under Article 5 without ratified bilateral boundary treaties. The absence of verification protocols comparable to the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe leaves both the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Russian ground forces without monitored buffer zones.

Strategic Question for Discussion
If a ceasefire creates a de facto line of control without formal boundary ratification, which mechanism is more effective for preventing renewed escalation along the Dnipro River — monitored buffer regimes patterned on the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe or bilateral security guarantees from NATO member states?
The available evidence points toward verified force-monitoring regimes as the more immediate stabilizing mechanism, given that ambiguity over treaty boundaries historically dilutes the credibility of third-party security guarantees. Without clear, inspectable demilitarised zones similar to those established under the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, foreign security commitments risk triggering inadvertent escalation rather than deterring forward troop movements. Consequently, structural stability along the Dnipro River depends less on external pledge language than on technical verification infrastructure accepted by both combatants.
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