Iran’s Foreign Policy: From the Balance of Power to the Pivot to the East

E-International Relations  |  Arman Mahmoudian

Iranian foreign policy evolved through successive balancing, third-power, and nationalist strategies from 1789 to the mid-twentieth century to counter intense geopolitical pressure from Russia and Great Britain. These shifting diplomatic doctrines sought to preserve national sovereignty as northern territorial losses under the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and eastern concessions eroded state independence.

This persistent vulnerability stemmed from severe domestic military, economic, and institutional weaknesses that left successive Qajar and Pahlavi administrations unable to enforce their neutrality or resist foreign demands. Consequently, efforts to leverage third powers like Napoleonic France, Germany, or the United States repeatedly failed because Iran lacked the strategic weight to justify major-power confrontation on its behalf. Following the joint Allied invasion of 1941, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi pivoted toward 'positive nationalism,' establishing a close security alignment with the United States as a reliable partner against Soviet expansionism, cementing a long-term shift in regional dynamics.

Comment

The historical memory of territorial truncation under the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 continues to dictate Tehran's deep-seated suspicion of external security guarantees. This enduring distrust explains why modern Iranian planners view tactical alignments with Moscow or Beijing not as permanent alliances, but as transactional mechanisms to offset Western pressure. By examining these Qajar-era diplomatic failures, contemporary analysts can better comprehend Iran's insistence on maintaining autonomous proxy networks rather than relying on formal defence pacts.

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