The US-Saudi nuclear deal isn’t dead—It’s dragging Washington into nonproliferation quicksand

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists | Sharon Squassoni

The Trump administration's recently signed nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia risks overturning 50 years of US nonproliferation policy by potentially facilitating domestic uranium enrichment. Although President Donald Trump subsequently conditioned the deal on Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, negotiations continue to advance sensitive fuel cycle capabilities.

This bilateral push builds on prior efforts by the Biden administration, which similarly sought to leverage nuclear concessions to secure diplomatic normalization in the Middle East. To bypass proliferation concerns, negotiators proposed a "black box" approach to protect US technology and a two-year commercial feasibility study, coupled with a ten-year cooling-off period. However, providing enrichment capabilities or Westinghouse reactors under these terms could trigger US sanctions under the Arms Export Control Act and spark a regional arms race. Ultimately, the kingdom's reluctance to adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol suggests its nuclear ambitions may extend beyond peaceful energy generation.

Comment

The willingness of Washington to negotiate a 123 agreement containing domestic enrichment pathways represents a fundamental shift away from the non-proliferation "gold standard" established in the 2009 US-UAE peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. By accommodating Riyadh's resistance to the IAEA's Additional Protocol, the United States risks undermining its own long-standing policy of restricting sensitive fuel cycle technologies in volatile regions. This concession weakens the normative power of future US civil nuclear diplomacy, indicating to other aspiring nuclear states that strategic leverage can successfully dilute standard non-proliferation safeguards.

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