Lessons Learned From Russia’s War Against Ukraine: The Case of Lithuania

The Jamestown Foundation  |  Eitvydas Bajarūnas

Lithuania faces sustained Russian hybrid pressure blending cyber, informational, economic, and kinetic sabotage tactics that fundamentally blur the boundaries between peace and wartime logic. Russian operations probe vulnerabilities across the Baltic region through GPS interference, underwater cable disruption, weaponized migration, and un-optimized drone incursions into low-altitude airspace. Traditional Baltic air defense systems remain in development, exposing critical gaps in protecting energy, communications, and logistical infrastructure against low-altitude threats.

Across prolonged conflict, potential Russian defeat, or Ukrainian victory scenarios, the Baltic Sea region is becoming a central frontline of European security, requiring accelerated defense production and rapid decision-making. Delays, institutional inertia, and gaps between total defense concepts and real-time execution risk undermining systemic deterrence before allied reinforcements arrive. Lithuanian security ultimately depends on building an integrated defense ecosystem that links military forces, emergency services, private businesses, and civil society while maintaining persistent support for Ukraine and NATO cohesion.

Comment

The blurring of grey-zone coercion and kinetic pressure challenges traditional NATO Article 5 threshold definitions by exploiting legal ambiguity below open warfare. Standard territorial defence doctrines assume clear early warning indicators prior to conventional force projection, whereas low-altitude drone incursions and undersea cable disruptions near Klaipėda collapse the timeline for defensive mobilisation. In this operational environment, waiting for institutional consensus before activating response protocols exposes critical national infrastructure to sub-threshold neutralisation.

This friction forces Baltic planners to shift from reactive reinforcement models to forward-deployed active interception frameworks. Integrating civilian observation grids with military air defence networks, such as Lithuania's NASAMS units, demands automated authorisation mechanisms that conflict with peacetime legal structures. Without pre-delegated engagement authority across regional command posts, tactical responses remain structurally slower than the grey-zone probing cycles executed by Russian forces.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If grey-zone incursions remain below the kinetic threshold for NATO Article 5 invocation, which element creates greater vulnerability for Lithuanian defenders — legal friction in pre-delegation rules or gaps in low-altitude NASAMS coverage around critical sites like Klaipėda?

The operational evidence indicates that legal friction surrounding engagement authority poses the more immediate vulnerability. While NASAMS batteries can be repositioned or supplemented with counter-drone sensors, delayed authorization protocols during sub-threshold incursions prevent commanders from employing existing assets effectively. Consequently, procedural hesitation during grey-zone probing risks allowing critical infrastructure damage before military response criteria are legally satisfied.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here