‘China Retains Levers for Long-Term Territorial Ambitions’

Asia Sentinel | Majid Maqbool

The People’s Republic of China is actively combining military coercion with political and informational warfare to establish a dominant hierarchy across the Indo-Pacific. Former Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale warns that Beijing systematically alters the territorial status quo along the Line of Actual Control before legalising these gains through protracted negotiations.

This "talk and fight" strategy relies on creating irreversible facts on the ground. To sustain this asymmetric advantage, the Chinese state is deploying artificial intelligence, big data, and cognitive warfare to penetrate rival societies and disrupt domestic decision-making. These operations are supported by long-term administrative provocations, including the renaming of locations in Arunachal Pradesh and joint Sino-Pak Joint Boundary Commission jurisdiction initiatives. India remains highly vigilant. Consequently, New Delhi is expanding its own cyber capabilities to breach Chinese firewalls and counter Beijing's growing narrative control over disputed border regions and historical claims.

Comment

Beijing's "talk and fight" doctrine along the Line of Actual Control reveals how tactical military manoeuvres are subordinated to long-term legal consolidation. By establishing physical outposts in disputed sectors before entering diplomatic talks, the People's Liberation Army shifts the burden of escalation onto New Delhi. This approach exploits the bilateral border management protocols of 1993 and 1996, turning confidence-building measures into tools for delaying the restoration of the status quo.

This pattern of incremental encroachment mirrors the maritime strategy executed at Mischief Reef in 1995, where initial structures were defended as temporary shelters before being upgraded into fortified military installations. In both theatres, the diplomatic track serves to freeze adversary reactions while the physical infrastructure is permanently reinforced. Consequently, the Sino-Pak Joint Boundary Commission's recent administrative assertions over parts of Kashmir represent a logical extension of this legal warfare doctrine.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Beijing continues to utilize the 1993 and 1996 border management protocols to delay status quo restoration, does the bilateral framework itself become a structural vulnerability for New Delhi, or does it still offer a necessary escalatory buffer?

The historical pattern suggests that maintaining these outdated protocols allows the People's Liberation Army to consolidate tactical gains under a veneer of diplomatic engagement. My assessment is that while the bilateral framework fails to deter gray-zone incursions, it remains a critical mechanism for preventing localized tactical skirmishes from spiraling into a full-scale conventional conflict. Consequently, the utility of the 1993 and 1996 agreements has shifted from conflict resolution to basic crisis communication.

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