Building an Edge in Modern War With Fast Following

Futura Doctrina | Mick Ryan

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) can secure a decisive military edge by systematically adopting 'fast following,' a strategic practice where a military copies and improves an adversary's innovations. This approach allows forces to let opponents absorb the initial development risks and costs before rapidly fielding superior, adapted versions of those technologies.

This adaptive cycle is highly visible in the war in Ukraine, where both belligerents continuously emulate each other's tactical and technological advancements. For example, Russia localized Iran's Shahed-136 drone as the Geran-2, while Ukraine rapidly copied Russian fiber-optic drones first deployed during the 2024 Kursk offensive. Speed is now the decisive variable. Institutional emulation has also accelerated, with Moscow establishing its own Unmanned Systems Forces in November 2025 to match Kyiv's pioneering 2024 force structure. To institutionalize this capability, Australia requires dedicated intermediaries like Ukraine's Brave1 to connect frontline operators with private developers and rapid procurement pipelines.

Comment

The rapid institutionalisation of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Russia's subsequent establishment of the Rubicon Center demonstrate that modern doctrinal adaptation has shifted from weapon-specific integration to entire structural reorganisations. This rapid structural emulation bypasses traditional multi-year procurement cycles, forcing the Kremlin and Kyiv to treat organisational design as a highly perishable asset. The Australian Defence Force faces a similar structural challenge, where peacetime acquisition frameworks remain misaligned with the compressed timelines of contemporary attrition warfare.

This operational acceleration occurs because cheap sensors and rapid industrial production compress the feedback loop between battlefield observation and doctrinal codification. For the Australian Defence Force, implementing this involves establishing direct, non-traditional procurement pathways modelled on Ukraine's Brave1 initiative to bypass standard bureaucratic delays. Consequently, the success of future ADF integration depends on whether the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group can legally and procedurally adopt these rapid, iterative acquisition cycles.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group attempts to integrate a fast-following model based on Ukraine's Brave1, does the inherent rigidity of peacetime democratic defence budgeting prevent the rapid scaling of these technologies, or can procedural workarounds suffice?

The available evidence suggests that standard peacetime budgeting frameworks within the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group are structurally incompatible with the weekly iteration cycles seen in Ukraine. While procedural workarounds like rapid prototyping funds can facilitate initial acquisition, scaling these capabilities to the wider Australian Defence Force requires a fundamental shift in legislative oversight. Consequently, my assessment is that without dedicated, non-traditional funding lines, any fast-following initiative will remain confined to isolated, small-scale pilot programs.

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