Russia’s Air War Aims to Bleed Ukraine Dry

Foreign Policy | Fredrik Wesslau

Russia is executing an intensified, systematic air campaign targeting Ukraine's critical infrastructure to paralyze the nation's economy and state functioning before winter. This expanded strategy utilizes advanced ballistic missiles and jet-powered Shahed drones to systematically disable railways, gas stations, data centers, and Black Sea shipping. The Kremlin's shift to a war economy now yields approximately 100 ballistic missiles monthly, severely outstripping Western interceptor production.

Consequently, Ukraine faces critical shortages of Patriot PAC-3 interceptors. Steel production has plummeted 60 percent. To counter this onslaught, Kyiv is collaborating with nine European nations on the Freyja initiative to develop domestic anti-ballistic missile systems. However, immediate defense requires Western deep-strike capabilities and intelligence to target Russian launch infrastructure directly. Meanwhile, the European Union must address Ukraine's projected 2026 budget deficit of $27 billion and waive carbon tariffs that threaten $4.7 billion in industrial exports between 2026 and 2030.

Comment

The deployment of jet-powered Shahed variants equipped with mesh radio networks represents a significant technological shift in the air war. By operating at speeds up to 375 miles per hour, these platforms drastically compress the reaction time available to Ukrainian mobile air defence teams. This speed, combined with real-time control capabilities, allows the systems to bypass traditional electronic warfare jamming. Consequently, Ukraine's reliance on the ZU-23-2 and searchlight-equipped mobile groups is increasingly obsolete against these high-speed Shahed variants.

The technical mechanism of the mesh radio network enables the drones to share telemetry and routing data dynamically in flight. If one platform encounters localised jamming, it reroutes control signals through adjacent nodes outside the electronic warfare envelope. This decentralised communication architecture neutralises the effectiveness of Ukrainian tactical jammers like the Bukovel-AD.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the deployment of mesh-networked Shahed drones continues to neutralise tactical electronic warfare systems like the Bukovel-AD, does the concept of low-cost kinetic point defence remain viable, or does it break down entirely?

The trajectory indicates that low-cost kinetic point defence will struggle to remain viable without a shift toward automated, radar-guided gun systems. My assessment is that relying on manual targeting and acoustic detection is insufficient against platforms operating at 375 miles per hour. Consequently, the operational utility of legacy systems will likely diminish unless they are integrated into a wider, multi-layered air defence network that utilises directed-energy weapons or rapid-firing interceptor drones.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here