The Fog of Tech

Foreign Affairs | Mara Karlin

Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and drone swarms are now shaping conflicts in Gaza, Iran, Lebanon and Ukraine, with combatants deploying them in the air, on land and at sea, sometimes in massive numbers. Mara Karlin warns that the United States risks a “technology trap”: treating new capabilities as guarantees of victory while neglecting war’s enduring political and human fundamentals.

She contrasts the apparent technological triumph of the 1990–91 Gulf War with later insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Ukraine, cheap drones, balloons and fishermen’s nets operate alongside precision glide bombs and ballistic missiles. Karlin argues that planners must define political ends, identify an adversary’s centre of gravity, sustain coalitions and learn systematically. The nature of war has not changed. Otherwise, technological confidence may hollow out deterrence, reduce civilian protection and widen the gap between the military and the society it serves.

Comment

The article’s central mechanism is that technology changes the means of war while leaving its political logic intact. A weapon system can improve targeting, extend range or reduce exposure for one’s own forces, but it cannot by itself define a political objective, distinguish a legitimate target from an illegitimate one, or decide when military action has achieved its purpose. The F-35 was described in 2017 as a “war winner”, yet Ukraine’s battlefield combines advanced missiles and drones with balloons, nets and improvised defences.

This matters because AI-enabled systems can make the process of war appear more precise than the judgement behind it. Israel’s Lavender system, for example, can generate targets rapidly, but its outputs still reflect the rules of engagement and civilian-casualty thresholds set by human decision-makers. Automation therefore relocates judgement rather than removing it: the decisive choices concern acceptable risk, proportionality and political purpose.

The same mechanism applies to strategy. NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre has institutionalised study of the Ukraine war, reflecting the point that learning must be deliberate rather than assumed. A military that treats technology as a substitute for a theory of victory risks mistaking capability for political effect.

Strategic Question for Discussion

In a conflict such as Ukraine, which matters more for victory: integrating AI-enabled systems at scale, or sustaining a clear theory of victory and coalition cohesion—and what would tip the balance?

The pattern suggests that scale and integration matter, but only once a force knows what political outcome it is seeking. Ukraine’s use of low-cost drones alongside sophisticated systems shows that adaptation can offset technological asymmetry, while the Gulf War and Iraq demonstrate that superior platforms cannot substitute for a coherent centre of gravity. My assessment is that coalition cohesion is likely to become the binding constraint, because technology can be procured more quickly than political alignment can be repaired.

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