The Scope and Nature of the U.S.-China Competition

RAND Corporation | Michael J. Mazarr, Amanda Kerrigan, Sam Plapinger, Jenna Murray, Gregory Weider Fauerbach, Habiba Ahmed, Benjamin Lenain, Marzia Giambertoni, Trevor Johnston, Tim McDonald, Ashley L. Rhoades, John Chen, Jon Schmid, Kristen Gunness, Stephanie Pezard, Jake Rinaldi, Alexandra Stark, Anne Stickells

The United States Department of War is funding a comprehensive RAND Corporation study to counter China's expanding influence in global science, technology, and digital networks. This initiative addresses a critical gap in American statecraft, where Washington has yet to fully invest in the non-military tools of long-term strategic competition, particularly in domestic economics and technological innovation.

At the core of this rivalry is a systemic contest to prove which governance model can best deliver domestic prosperity and national resilience during intense global instability. While China's rise is non-linear and constrained by external balancing, its integrated campaigns across seven key areas of national power threaten to outpace American capabilities. Technology remains the primary battleground. To secure strategic leverage, the study recommends that Washington prioritize domestic economic reforms, secure artificial intelligence networks, and strengthen global alliances to constrain Beijing's geopolitical ambitions while leveraging third-party alignments.

Comment

The Office of the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering is shifting its focus toward non-kinetic technological networks to counter Chinese integration. This transition reflects a growing recognition that Pentagon military dominance is contingent on securing foundational digital infrastructure against Chinese state-backed firms. By prioritising the Global Competitive Analysis framework, the National Defense Research Institute demonstrates how artificial intelligence and network standards dictate modern geopolitical leverage.

Consequently, future congressional defence appropriations will likely favour software-defined capabilities over traditional hardware procurement to match Beijing's civil-military fusion. This funding shift will force the U.S. defence industrial base to integrate commercial Silicon Valley firms directly into military supply chains. Ultimately, the success of this strategy depends on the Federal Communications Commission aligning with defence priorities to secure global telecommunications corridors.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Office of the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering successfully pivots toward software-defined capabilities, how will the Pentagon reconcile this shift with the legacy hardware procurement cycles mandated by Congress?

The pattern suggests that reconciling software-defined acquisition with legacy procurement will require Congress to expand middle-tier acquisition authorities, such as Section 804 pathways. However, resistance from traditional defence primes is likely to slow this transition, as their business models remain optimised for long-term hardware sustainment. My assessment is that the Pentagon will initially bypass traditional structures by routing software funding through non-traditional defence innovation units.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here