18 November 2026

China’s Activities in Island States: Sri Lanka as a Case

Institute for Security and Development Policy | Nilanthi Samaranayake

Sri Lanka recorded roughly $5 billion in imports from China in 2025, but generated only $279 million in exports, compounding a heavy bilateral trade imbalance following Colombo's 2022 debt default. While the United States remains Sri Lanka's largest export destination, Beijing maintains substantial leverage across island development projects.

Tourism revenue reached $3.2 billion in 2025. However, China ranked fifth with 132,035 arrivals, trailing India's total of over half a million visitors and the United Kingdom's 210,000 tourists. Beijing provided direct military and diplomatic support to Colombo before civil war hostilities ended in 2009. Formal free trade negotiations have stalled for over a decade. Following the Maldives' implementation of its Chinese free trade agreement under President Mohamed Muizzu in 2025, Sri Lankan leadership faces renewed pressure to expand commercial ties with Beijing while navigating broader Indo-Pacific security dynamics across neighboring Indian Ocean island nations including Mauritius and Seychelles.

Comment

Persistent bilateral trade deficits severely restrict a developing state's monetary sovereignty, forcing structural dependence on foreign credit lines during sovereign debt restructuring. Sri Lanka's trade imbalance with China—importing $5 billion while exporting only $279 million—mirrors the capital accumulation patterns seen prior to the 2017 transfer of Hambantota International Port under a 99-year lease. When sovereign foreign exchange reserves collapse, non-equity liabilities are routinely converted into long-term infrastructure concessions.

A parallel dynamic unfolded in Djibouti following the construction of the Doraleh Multipurpose Port, where heavy bilateral debt exposure to the Export-Import Bank of China culminated in host-nation concessions for Beijing's first overseas military support base in 2017. As commercial trade deficits widen across Indian Ocean maritime nodes, sovereign borrowers face diminished capacity to decline dual-use infrastructure integration requests from state-backed creditors like China Communications Construction Company.

Strategic Question for Discussion
When sovereign states balance acute trade imbalances against infrastructure debt, does host-nation leverage decay faster through debt-for-equity conversions at Hambantota International Port or through dual-use commercial concessions at the Doraleh Multipurpose Port?
The trajectory indicates that long-term equity transfers like the 99-year lease at Hambantota International Port erode host-nation strategic autonomy more permanently than operational concessions. While commercial management at sites like Doraleh allows periodic diplomatic renegotiation, equity surrender locks in extraterritorial operational control across maritime chokepoints.
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