Global Public Opinion on China: China’s Standing in Southeast Asia’s Swing States

Asia Society | Kevin Zongzhe Li

Southeast Asia’s swing states—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—are experiencing a steady decline in public favorability toward China, dropping from an average of +33 in the 2000s to +20 in the 2020s. This shift threatens Beijing's long-term geopolitical influence as maritime disputes increasingly overshadow historical economic cooperation.

While deep supply chain integration and Belt and Road Initiative investments establish a durable economic floor, persistent territorial friction in the South China Sea acts as a primary driver of public skepticism. According to the Global Public Opinion on China dataset, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff marked a critical turning point, causing regional favorability to plunge from +33 to +21. Consequently, future diplomatic alignment across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will likely depend on how these autonomous governments balance localized social friction from Chinese-backed industrial projects against their ongoing reliance on northern trade networks.

Comment

The erosion of public trust following the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff demonstrates how quickly tactical maritime assertiveness can undermine Beijing's long-term diplomatic objectives within the ASEAN framework. This domestic friction directly limits the political space for administrations in Manila and Hanoi to formalise joint maritime patrols or defense agreements with the People's Liberation Army. Instead, persistent public anxiety drives these capitals to revitalise traditional security alliances, as evidenced by the expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between Manila and Washington.

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