Reindustrialization and Great Power Competition: Deterrence by Capacity

Center for Strategic and International Studies  |  Benjamin Jensen

The United States Department of War and Congress face a critical conventional deterrence deficit as low munitions stockpiles and constrained industrial capacity limit the nation's ability to sustain a protracted conflict against adversaries like the People's Republic of China and Russia. This vulnerability allows rivals to discount American resolve, calculating they can prevail through attrition.

Historically, Washington addressed these supply chain bottlenecks through executive orders and increased procurement funding, yet rapid operational consumption in Ukraine and the Middle East continues to outpace production. To counter this, a new 'deterrence by capacity' framework treats industrial surge capability, rapid repair throughput, and multiyear procurement contracts as active deterrent signals rather than mere logistics. By scaling up production of Standard Missile-6 and PAC-3 interceptors alongside the Family of Affordable Mass Missiles program, policymakers aim to permanently shift adversary cost-benefit calculations over long-term, continuous campaigns.

Comment

The transition to seven-year procurement deals for the Standard Missile-6 and PAC-3 represents a fundamental shift from peacetime efficiency to wartime readiness. By guaranteeing long-term demand, this contracting mechanism allows defence prime contractors to expand physical manufacturing facilities and secure fragile sub-tier supply chains. However, the immediate operational consumption of Patriot interceptors in Eastern Europe and the Middle East continues to deplete existing stockpiles faster than these expanded assembly lines can deliver replacements. This persistent deficit exposes a structural lag where industrial capacity cannot easily match the high-tempo expenditure rates of contemporary state-on-state attrition.

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