Staff Processes in Large-Scale Combat Operations Part IV: Targeting as Part of Combined Arms

Small Wars Journal  |  James Villanueva, John R. Harrell, Joe Hammond, Tylor Bott

United States Army divisions participating in Warfighter Exercises are struggling to synchronize fires and maneuver, exposing critical tactical vulnerabilities in large-scale combat operations due to an over-reliance on counterinsurgency-era targeting processes. This operational friction prevents command staffs from massing combat power at decisive points, resulting in disjointed frontal attacks rather than unified division-level actions.

Decades of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decoupled deliberate targeting from ground maneuver, transforming targeting into a rigid, slow-moving planning process rather than an agile tactical enabler. Correcting this doctrinal drift requires transitioning from sequential operations to simultaneous combined arms integration within the close area. Implementing sophisticated envelopments using multiple Brigade Combat Teams allows tactical commanders to achieve necessary three-to-one combat power ratios. Ultimately, restoring the division as the principal tactical unit of action requires shifting to dynamic execution that leverages organic assets to find, fix, finish, and follow-through against peer adversaries.

Comment

The persistent friction observed during the US Army's Mission Command Training Program reveals a deep-seated cultural resistance to abandoning the highly centralised, deliberate targeting cycles that characterised the post-9/11 counterinsurgency paradigm. This structural inertia directly undermines the fluid, decentralised execution mandated by ADP 3-0, where rapid exploitation of fleeting battlefield opportunities is paramount. By treating fires and manoeuvre as sequential phases rather than a unified combined arms construct, modern division headquarters risk replicating the rigid, easily bypassed defensive schemes of the French Army's 1930s methodical battle doctrine. Consequently, the inability to dynamically mass organic artillery and aviation assets at decisive points leaves forward brigade combat teams highly vulnerable to peer adversaries capable of rapid, multi-directional manoeuvres.

To read in details click here