19 August 2026

Ukraine and Iran: why military strength doesn’t mean winning wars

The Conversation | Martin Waehlisch

Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump command vast military power, yet conventional dominance fails to secure political victory in Ukraine or the Middle East. Following the assassination of Ali Khamenei on February 28, 2026, Mojtaba Khamenei inherited a conflict alongside Iranian leadership, leveraging low-cost capabilities to deny decisive outcomes.

Modern defenders exploit time, drone proliferation, and economic disruption to erode adversary resolve, illustrating how the classic logic of asymmetric warfare has evolved. Ukrainian forces demonstrate this paradigm by degrading the oil pipelines and refineries funding Moscow, alongside Caspian Sea drone strikes that disrupt Iranian supply lines to Russia. Conversely, US and Israeli strikes degrade infrastructure but cannot impose a permanent political settlement in Tehran, mirroring Russia's inability to coerce Kyiv despite years of full-scale invasion. As two distinct theaters become increasingly connected, conventional military superiority and unconventional tactics both encounter systemic limits, generating unbreakable strategic stalemates where power yields destruction rather than durable control.

Comment

Mass-produced uncrewed strike weapons like the Shahed-136 have exposed a fundamental flaw in Western integrated air defence doctrine. Ground-based systems built around high-cost interceptors, such as the MIM-104 Patriot or Iron Dome, were engineered to counter low-volume ballistic and cruise missile threats rather than sustained saturation attacks. By forcing operators to expend PAC-3 interceptors against platform architectures costing a fraction of that figure, attrition warfare shifts from force destruction to economic depletion.

This structural imbalance forces air defence doctrine away from point-defence interceptors toward layered, non-kinetic counter-UAS networks and rapid-fire naval gun systems like the Phalanx CIWS. Consequently, US Central Command faces an ongoing reallocation of RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles away from offensive naval task groups toward static point protection for Red Sea shipping lanes. Until long-range strike operations directly neutralise manufacturing nodes like the Shahed aviation assembly complex in Yelabuga, modern air defence doctrine remains trapped in an unfavourable economic attrition curve.

Strategic Question for Discussion
Which carries more weight in long-term air defence planning — expanding magazine depth with systems like the MIM-104 Patriot, or shifting doctrine toward kinetic counter-strikes against production nodes like Yelabuga?
Share your assessment in the comments below.

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