Editor's Notes: October 7 shattered Israel’s old political map, next election may redraw it

The Jerusalem Post  |  Zvika Klein

Former IDF Brig.-Gen. (res.) Ofer Winter launched a new Israeli political party named People of Israel, placing ultra-Orthodox conscription and accountability for the October 7 attacks at the center of his right-wing platform. The movement draws significant support from former Likud, Religious Zionist, and Otzma Yehudit voters while capturing previously undecided electors.

Israel's post-October 7 security reality has fundamentally fractured long-standing partisan categories across the domestic electorate. Previously championed by secular center-left factions, the debate over haredi draft exemptions now commands prominent advocacy from religious reserve officers and bereaved families. Polling from Lazar Research and Direct Polls highlights extreme volatility, with party projections ranging from zero to six Knesset seats ahead of candidate list filings. Winter's explicit refusal to join Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud list underscores deep political fragmentation among traditional right-wing blocs. Voters increasingly reject legacy political party structures.

Comment

The political elevation of the ultra-Orthodox draft debate exposes a structural shift in how the Israel Defense Forces approaches force generation after months of high-intensity combat. Operating under sustained operational strain across multiple fronts, the military's traditional reliance on a compact active force backed by reservists has reached its operational limit. The integration of Haredi manpower is no longer merely a coalition bargaining chip, but a direct determinant of active-duty rotation schedules for frontline combat formations such as the Golani Brigade.

As reserve combat units face unprecedented deployment durations, prolonged service burdens threaten to degrade combat readiness and retention across elite formations like the 98th Paratroopers Division. This structural bottleneck directly affects brigade-level force availability during sustained multi-theatre contingencies. Consequently, any delay in expanding the conscription base forces the IDF Personnel Directorate to extend operational tours at the expense of mandatory training cycles.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If prolonged deployment cycles force the IDF Personnel Directorate to prioritize active frontline presence over training, how will elite formations like the 98th Paratroopers Division adapt their tactical doctrine without suffering severe degradation in combat readiness?

The pattern suggests that elite units will increasingly rely on condensed operational training blocks integrated directly into active rotations rather than dedicated home-station cycles. My assessment is that while this preserves immediate operational availability for formations like the 98th Paratroopers Division, it risks narrowing specialized skill sets required for complex multi-theatre offensive operations.

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