Leave Europe to the Europeans: The Case for a U.S. Military Drawdown

Foreign Affairs | Jennifer Kavanagh and Justin Logan

The Pentagon initiated the Europe Posture Review under Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to formally transition primary responsibility for conventional defense to European allies. Washington currently allocates roughly $100 billion annually toward European security while maintaining approximately 80,000 troops across the continent. Decades of security guarantees have fostered structural dependency among European powers despite a national debt exceeding $40 trillion.

The proposed plan outlines withdrawing the rotational combat brigade in Poland, repatriating the 2nd Cavalry Regiment from Germany, cutting tactical fighter squadrons from seven to four, and recalling three destroyers from Rota Naval Station in Spain. Congress has actively resisted force reductions by embedding minimum personnel thresholds within the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. Fiscal limits force hard choices. A disciplined withdrawal schedule through 2027 and 2028 would compel European nations to generate organic heavy ground formations and air defenses. Meanwhile, Russia's military attrition in Ukraine provides a crucial window for Europe to assume regional deterrence.

Comment

Reallocating forward-deployed assets like Arleigh Burke-class destroyers from Rota Naval Station directly trades European air defence capacity for Indo-Pacific naval concentration. Withdrawing three Aegis-equipped destroyers relieves operational pressure on the U.S. Navy's surface fleet while eroding NATO's sea-based ballistic missile defence umbrella in the Mediterranean. This shift transfers the burden of maritime air defence to European navies currently lacking equivalent Aegis baseline integration.

The mechanics of this tradeoff hinge on missile inventory burn rates and rotational maintenance windows at Spanish facilities. Sustaining a persistent three-ship ballistic missile defence station off Rota requires a dedicated operational pool of six to eight destroyers. Repatriating those hulls expands available surface strike capacity for Seventh Fleet operations in the Western Pacific, but leaves southern European allies dependent on land-based Aegis Ashore sites at Deveselu and Redzikowo.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which carries more operational risk for NATO—the coverage gap left by withdrawing Aegis destroyers from Rota Naval Station, or the geographical fixation of land-based sites at Deveselu and Redzikowo?

The operational risk weighs more heavily on the fixed geography of Deveselu and Redzikowo, which lack the mobility to adjust against unexpected threat vectors or saturation attacks. While Rota-based destroyers provide flexible multi-mission air defence across maritime sectors, relying solely on static Aegis Ashore installations leaves European ballistic missile defence coverage vulnerable to targeting suppression and constrained engagement arcs.

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