17 September 2026

How to Negotiate with Vladimir Putin

National Interest | Ahmed Charai

US Special Envoy Jared Kushner is conducting diplomatic negotiations to end the war in Ukraine through a five-point enforcement framework grounded in President Ronald Reagan’s 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty paradigm of verification. Russian missile strikes, such as the destruction of a $70 million Rozetka logistics center near Kyiv employing around 1,000 people, underscore the humanitarian and economic toll driving calls for a structured ceasefire.

Persistent Russian power projection across Africa, strategic alignment with Iran, and operations against Western interests demonstrate that Moscow will exploit diplomatic openings without robust enforcement. Naïve concessions endanger Western deterrence. The proposed diplomatic doctrine requires an immediate cessation of attacks on critical infrastructure monitored by satellite intelligence, deferring legal sovereignty questions over occupied territories while guaranteeing Ukrainian air defense capabilities. Sanctions must remain active until compliance is verified, ensuring reconstruction of Black Sea maritime corridors and energy systems increases the material cost of renewed aggression.

Comment

The enforcement architecture of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty demonstrated that arms control agreements endure only when backed by intrusive technical verification. That treaty succeeded because the On-Site Inspection Agency executed continuous portal monitoring at Votkinsk and Salt Lake City. Applying these technical inspection mechanisms to a Ukrainian ceasefire relies on satellite monitoring and perimeter sensors across the contact line.

A similar technical framework sustained the 1975 Sinai II Agreement between Egypt and Israel. American-monitored sensor fields in the Giddi Pass and Mitla Pass provided early warning against surprise armoured manoeuvres. Installing analogous electro-optical inspection stations along the Svatove–Kreminna line would similarly deter Russian offensive rebuilds.

Strategic Question for Discussion
Which carries more weight when designing a Ukrainian ceasefire line — the continuous portal monitoring model of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or the demilitarised sensor buffer used in the 1975 Sinai II Agreement?
The structural conditions along the Svatove–Kreminna line suggest that static portal monitoring alone cannot account for dispersed artillery and drone logistics. My assessment is that an active sensor network modelled on the 1975 Sinai II Agreement offers superior operational coverage across a fluid frontline. Satellite reconnaissance combined with automated ground sensors provides immediate warning of armoured shifts without requiring permanent garrison access.
Share your assessment in the comments below.