Iran Has Already Chosen Its Targets for the Next Round

RealClearWorld | Avraham Shmulevich

United States and Israeli military commanders have prepared operational plans for a short, high-intensity campaign against Iranian nuclear, missile, and energy infrastructure following the 3 November midterm elections. Three U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups and thousands of Marines are deploying to the Middle East by early November. This concentration of naval and amphibious forces coincides with troop repositioning away from vulnerable bases in Jordan, Qatar, and Kuwait.

While domestic political concerns over American fuel prices exceeding $4 per gallon have repeatedly delayed military action, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps retains significant asymmetric options. Iran has systematically targeted regional energy infrastructure beyond its borders to influence global oil markets. Successful drone strikes have already disrupted critical bypass routes, including Saudi Arabia's seven-million-barrel-per-day East-West pipeline and the United Arab Emirates' Fujairah terminal. Energy markets remain vulnerable. By targeting energy chains like Egypt's SUMED pipeline and Azerbaijan's BTC pipeline, Tehran can trigger economic pressure regardless of domestic strikes.

Comment

The IRGC's targeting of crude transport nodes illustrates how asymmetric strikes on critical bypass routes degrade sovereign energy security without breaching well-defended perimeter facilities. Interdicting choke points like the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline or Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline neutralises overland diversion capacity designed to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. By demonstrating precision drone capabilities against geographically exposed pumping stations, Iranian forces leverage minor ordnance expenditures into disproportionate economic disruption.

This operational vulnerability forces regional energy exporters to redistribute point-defense systems from inland industrial hubs to extended pipeline corridors. Consequently, Saudi and Emirati air defence architectures face severe coverage gaps when defending isolated pumping infrastructure like the Abqaiq processing network against low-altitude loitering munitions.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor presents a more insurmountable challenge for Gulf energy security during a sustained campaign — the vulnerability of overland bypass routes like the East-West pipeline, or the inability of air defence systems to protect distributed nodes like the Abqaiq processing network?

The available evidence points toward the protection of distributed pipeline networks as the far more acute vulnerability. While point-target defence can mitigate direct strikes on centralised facilities like the Abqaiq processing network, intercepting low-altitude loitering munitions along thousands of kilometres of exposed infrastructure like the East-West pipeline exceeds current regional air defence capacities.

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