The Gulf States and Iran: Past and Future Trajectories

IISS

Iranian military forces expanded direct attacks across the Middle East on 28 February 2026, targeting commercial ports, airports, power utilities, and dual-use infrastructure throughout the Gulf states. This unprecedented campaign weaponises the region's global economic centrality and host infrastructure supporting American forces. Iran's horizontal escalation abruptly shattered the diplomatic de-escalation established under the 2023 Beijing agreement.

Tehran's tightening control over the Strait of Hormuz has severely disrupted maritime supply lines. The conflict exposes deep strategic fractures within the Gulf Cooperation Council. Bahrain led United Nations Security Council Resolution 2817 on 11 March 2026 to condemn these strikes. Most member states have discreetly granted the United States military access to their territorial airspace and bases. Oman remains a notable exception. Long-term regional stability now requires extensive military institution reforms, enhanced infrastructure resilience, and coordinated air defence networks rather than relying solely on fragile diplomatic arrangements.

Comment

Targeting dual-use infrastructure such as desalinisation plants, power stations, and commercial port terminals reveals a systematic effort to disrupt the logistical endurance of defending forces. By forcing Gulf authorities to divert limited air defence interceptors toward protecting municipal utilities, Iranian strikes degrade the sustainment capacity of regional military installations. The precedent set by the 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais drone and missile attacks demonstrated how energy and utility nodes function as operational vulnerability points.

This infrastructure disruption cascades directly into coalition sustainment operations across the broader theater. Prolonged attrition of civilian power and water grids severely compromises the domestic supply chains that support forward-deployed units at Prince Sultan Air Base. Consequently, operational endurance in long-range air defence engagements becomes contingent on civil infrastructure resilience around facilities like Prince Sultan Air Base rather than interceptor magazine depth alone.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If targeting dual-use civilian infrastructure successfully strains logistics around facilities like Prince Sultan Air Base, which factor poses a greater threat to theater endurance — interceptor magazine depletion or municipal utility vulnerability?

The available evidence points toward municipal utility vulnerability as the more immediate operational bottleneck for theater endurance. While interceptor stockpiles at installations like Prince Sultan Air Base can be sustained via military airlift, repairing damaged desalinisation and power generation facilities requires extended industrial lead times. Consequently, horizontal strike campaigns generate severe operational friction by targeting the non-military supply chains underpinning regional defense posture.

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