How Would China Actually Govern Taiwan?

The Diplomat | Filip Čápek and Jin-Ruei Ho

On September 12, Chinese scholars at the University of Hong Kong’s Beijing Center reached a 12-point consensus outlining post-unification governance for Taiwan under a modified "One Country, Two Systems" framework. The proposed plan mandates that all local authority derive from Beijing, placing defense and foreign affairs under central control.

This blueprint builds upon Xi Jinping’s 2019 speech advocating a "Two Systems" solution while introducing contingency provisions for non-peaceful unification. Under a coercive scenario, scholars envision a three-to-five-year period of "quasi-military governance" to suppress independence advocates. Taiwanese forces would be completely disbanded. The People's Liberation Army would assume sole responsibility for island defense, positioning Taiwan as a strategic bulwark in the First Island Chain. Post-unification plans also detail deep economic integration through a "Zhejiang-Fujian-Taiwan Greater Bay Area" and mandatory patriotic educational reforms. Crucially, the symposium entirely excluded Taiwanese participants, leaving key practical implementation mechanics and political consensus unresolved.

Comment

Transitioning Taiwan’s military structure into a unified Chinese defense architecture introduces severe structural friction within the Central Military Commission. Dissolving Taiwanese service branches and absorbing personnel into the People's Liberation Army breaks the constitutional neutrality mandated by Article 138 of the Republic of China Constitution. The operational shift replaces a localized defense command with direct authority under Beijing's Central Military Commission. This centralized command hierarchy eliminates autonomous theater-level decision-making for forces stationed along the Taiwan Strait.

The mechanism for establishing this control relies on embedding Central Military Commission political commissars directly into post-transition administrative bodies across the island. Enforcing a top-down Chinese Communist Party command apparatus over the former Republic of China Armed Forces requires comprehensive political vetting. Consequently, initial operational authority in the Taiwan Strait would reside entirely with the Eastern Theater Command in Nanjing.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If operational authority over Taiwan is fully centralized under Beijing's Eastern Theater Command, how would the Central Military Commission manage the command friction between political commissars and integrated local administrative structures?

The available evidence points toward significant command friction during any transitional period, as party control mechanisms struggle to oversee previously non-politicized institutions. My assessment is that the Eastern Theater Command would prioritize strict political vetting over operational flexibility, likely creating severe delays in local decision-making cycles. This friction would be further compounded by the absence of established legal frameworks for dual party-military governance on the island.

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