The Evolution of Taiwan’s Military

The Diplomat | Mercy Kuo

Taiwan's military has evolved from a Nationalist party-army into a democratic, civilian-led force capable of confronting increasing Chinese military pressure. Following Chinese exercises triggered by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's August 2022 visit, 85 percent of Taiwanese respondents supported extending compulsory military service. This public shift accelerated defense spending, which will triple between 2016 and 2027.

Taiwan's posture reflects this fiscal growth. The Overall Defense Concept emphasizes asymmetric capabilities, prioritizing stealthy corvettes, naval mines, and anti-ship missiles over major surface combatants to counter potential PLA blockades or assaults on outlying islands like Taiping Island. Concurrently, domestic institutions including NCSIST and CSBC are expanding local production to reduce reliance on foreign supply chains. Taiwan launched its first Indigenous Defense Submarine, the Hai Kun, in mid-2023 as part of an eight-vessel fleet planned by the mid-30s. Consequently, regional posture is shifting toward a trilateral alignment involving Japan, which depends on local sea lanes for 90 percent of its energy imports.

Comment

Taiwan's emphasis on indigenous production through the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology and CSBC Corporation exposes the industrial limits of self-reliance under diplomatic isolation. While domestic shipyards assembled the Hai Kun submarine, the platform remains dependent on foreign key technologies, including U.S. export licenses for integrated combat systems. Localizing hull fabrication and missile production alters assembly line economics, yet fails to eliminate critical vulnerabilities in subcomponent supply chains.

This industrial friction mirrors Sweden's Cold War defense model, where Saab and Kockums maintained domestic manufacturing for the Gotland-class submarine while remaining reliant on foreign propulsion and avionics inputs. For the Legislative Yuan, maintaining domestic defense industrial throughput requires continuous capital allocation without fully decoupling from external technology suppliers.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Taiwan's Hai Kun submarine program remains reliant on foreign export licenses for sensor suites, does domestic hull manufacturing at CSBC Corporation genuinely insulate defense posture during a blockade, or does it merely transfer supply chain bottlenecks to international vendors?

The available evidence points toward persistent vulnerability in high-technology components, even as physical shipyard assembly shifts to CSBC Corporation. While localized manufacturing ensures basic platform assembly and hull maintenance, crucial combat systems and specialized sonar arrays still require external approvals from foreign partners. Consequently, domestic shipyard throughput mitigates initial replenishment delays but leaves high-tier sensor integration exposed to foreign political constraints during an extended embargo.

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