Ukraine War: Drone And Missile Warfare Dominating Combat Operations – Analysis

Eurasia Review | Can Kasapoğlu

Ukrainian drone forces struck nearly 18,000 Russian targets during the first week of November 2026, including the Rostec-operated Morozov Plant producing explosives and ballistic missile propellants near St. Petersburg. The strike targeted production for the Iskander-M system, illustrating Kyiv's strategy to disrupt Moscow's deep-strike inventory at the industrial source.

Concurrently, Ukrainian long-range strikes against nine of Russia's 35 major refineries cut crude processing by 200,000 metric tons per day. Tactical operations featured FirePoint FP-2 strike drones targeting launch hubs at Donetsk Airport. Moscow responded with heavy aerial salvos. Ground engagements remained locked at 180 to 200 daily battles around Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka. In October, Russia launched up to 8,500 Shahed-type drones, though Ukrainian defenses maintained an 84 percent interception rate. Deployments of jet-powered variants like the Geran-5 K5-K signal an operational shift toward higher-velocity loitering munitions to compress defense reaction times across Ukrainian airspace.

Comment

The integration of micro-turbojet propulsion into the Geran-5 K5-K changes the target-tracking physics for point-defence interceptors. Traditional piston-engine Shahed-136 platforms travel below 120 miles per hour, allowing mobile gun crews equipped with Gepard SPAAG systems to engage them using optical rangefinders and thermal sights. At speeds exceeding 280 miles per hour, the reduced engagement window forces air defence batteries to rely almost exclusively on radar-guided surface-to-air missiles.

This velocity increase reduces total flight duration across Ukrainian radar coverage zones, narrowing the effective intercept arc for short-range air defence systems. Higher cruise speeds also consume fuel at roughly three times the rate of internal combustion UAVs, capping operational range unless warhead mass is reduced. Consequently, the operational utility of the Geran-5 K5-K depends on whether micro-turbojet production can match the manufacturing scale of lower-cost piston engines.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Russia scales mass production of micro-turbojet engines for platforms like the Geran-5 K5-K, which factor will dictate air defence viability more—the cost asymmetry of firing radar-guided missiles against low-cost jets, or the attrition rate of mobile gun systems like the Gepard SPAAG?

My assessment is that expenditure ratios, rather than gun-system attrition, will drive the operational tipping point. While SPAAG platforms retain localized utility, the speed of the Geran-5 K5-K narrows gun engagement windows enough to force defender reliance on high-cost interceptors like NASAMS or IRIS-T, making missile supply lines the critical bottleneck.

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