17 March 2014

How Ukraine could overcome its crisis

March 14, 2014

Russia's intervention threatens Ukraine's already fragile economy.

By Robert Kahn

Armed men, believed to be Russian servicemaen, stand guard near barbed wire outside an Ukrainian military base in Perevalnoye on March 13, 2014.

FORTUNE -- As Russian officials on Thursday announced new military operations in several regions near the Ukrainian border, it becomes clear that the country isn't just dealing with a political crisis. Its economy is also in jeopardy. The political turmoil we've seen over the past two months has exposed Ukraine's vulnerable economy -- a product of years of unsustainable economic polices that include massive energy subsidies and corruption. Addressing these imbalances would have been challenging even in the best of circumstances. With Russia's military intervention, however, Ukraine has an even tougher job -- one that calls for a comprehensive and sustained economic response requiring governments to go outside their comfort zone and learn lessons from past financial crises. If Ukraine is to overcome its crisis, here are three elements international policymakers must address:

1. Fast cash, steady reform

The centerpiece of the Western response must be financial aid and expanded trade. In response to Russian aggressions in Crimea, Western governments, the IMF, and development banks have announced commitments totaling around $20 billion, but most of the money is for financing longer-term projects. While the project financing is critical for long-term growth, much of it would have come in any event; it will do little to address the current crisis. The "real water" -- upfront additional funding for the budget -- totals around $5 billion, consisting of $1 billion in U.S. government loan guarantees, $3 billion in European Union assistance, and around $1 billion in fast-disbursing World Bank loans. That might be enough to allow the government to provide essential services and restore economic and financial stability between now and the elections scheduled for May. But if past emerging market banking and debt crises are a guide, financing needs are likely to outstrip the current expectations of the official community.

Furthermore, after the change in government, Western governments made the initial mistake of pressing for a quick deal containing major and upfront austerity measures. The EU loans also depended on an IMF deal. This puts the cart before the horse, since it could be some time before Ukraine has a legitimate government in place to make the needed commitments (e.g., raising energy prices and putting fiscal policy on a sustainable track, reforming state enterprises and the energy sector, and addressing corruption), or for there to be sufficient clarity about the economic and political conditions that would allow an IMF program to succeed. Meanwhile, Ukraine's central bank continues to lose reserves; its banking system is broken, and the government is having trouble providing basic services and collecting taxes.

The Use of Russia’s Military in the Crimean Crisis

Johan Norberg
MARCH 13, 2014 

SUMMARY

The Crimea operation may not be the last use of military force the world sees in the Ukraine crisis.

Russia’s military actions in Crimea have shown that it is prepared to use its armed forces to achieve political aims. When masked men with weapons moved into the autonomous region in southern Ukraine on February 27, the effort was not a spur-of-the-moment decision by Russia. 

Indeed, it is clear that the Crimea operation, which seemed to have started immediately after the Sochi Winter Olympics ended and took place amid ongoing tensions between pro- and anti-Russian forces across Ukraine, was mapped out well in advance. It is likely to be part of a longer-term planning framework for Ukraine, as various military options were being weighed as the Ukrainian government under Viktor Yanukovych crumbled and other political events in the country unfolded. 

Granted, the Russian military has yet to be truly tested in Crimea. Russian forces have met no organized resistance and seen virtually no fighting. So far, the military has been used primarily as a show of force. It has succeeded in creating facts on the ground, but in a largely benign environment. 

Nonetheless, its impressive ability to seize the initiative, coordinate political and military actions, and use tactical maskirovka (diversions) has kept the West and presumably the new Ukrainian government on edge and guessing what will come next. Although information about the inner workings of the Russian military is scarce, it would appear that the use of military means in the unfolding events in Ukraine is by no means over. 

A SNAP EXERCISE IN THE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT 

Crimea has so far been the focus of Russia’s military operation, with Russian forces and political attention centered on the region. The Kremlin’s show of force began before the military took control of Crimea’s capital, Simferopol. 

On February 26, Russia launched a major military exercise in its Western Military District (MD), which, along with the Southern MD, borders Ukraine. The exercise seemed designed to flex Russia’s military muscle from the Kola Peninsula to the Ukrainian border and demonstrate resolve on a political level to dissuade any other actor from intervening in Ukraine. It also distracted attention from Crimea. 

The exercise reportedly involved, among other forces, three armies—two from the Western MD and one from the Central MD—just as tensions were rising in Crimea. Open-source reporting from Russia’s Southern MD surprisingly indicated that the district was going about “business as usual,” despite its proximity to Crimea and the fact that it is well placed to be a staging area for operations into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. This district also has the highest readiness in the Russian Armed Forces. 

Foundations-of-german-power

Germany today is widely regarded as the most powerful country in Europe. But it is often reluctant to take the lead. This hesitance has much to do with the foundations of German power—Berlin has considerable resources but also faces considerable constraints. Most importantly, German power is embedded in the European Union, which both enhances and confines the country’s capability to be a foreign policy player.

And on security, Berlin depends on its Western allies, especially the United States. But as the United States is reducing its footprint in Europe, Germany needs to step up its game.

ECONOMY AND GEOGRAPHY

German power rests primarily on the country’s economic strength. In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), Germany ranks fourth in the world, behind the United States, China, and Japan, and ahead of France and the United Kingdom. Thanks to its economic weight, Germany is a global player, a role it exercises, for example, through its membership in the G8 group of leading economies. This gives the country status, influence, and a certain independence in its decisionmaking.

Germany has come through the global financial crisis in better shape than most European countries. It expects healthy economic growth in years to come, and the officialGDP growth forecast for 2014 is 1.75 percent. With its solid manufacturing base and many “hidden champions”―globally successful small and medium-sized businesses―the German economy has drawn worldwide admiration, despite regular criticism of its strong emphasis on exports.


Geography also contributes to German power. Situated in the middle of Europe, the country lies at a crossroads of trans-European flows of goods and people, between Central Europe and Western Europe, between Scandinavia and the Mediterranean. Germany has strong economic, social, and political ties with all its neighbors. It is ideally placed to play a mediating role between the different political, social, and economic views and attitudes in Europe.

Because of its size―the result of a number of wars and a peaceful reunification in 1990―Germany is big enough to play in the European premier league. But at the same time, it is too small and too weak to dominate the continent. Germany’s power depends on its ability to get along with its European neighbors and to cooperate closely with them.

EMBEDDED IN THE EU

The European Union, shaped mainly by Germany and France, provides the mechanism through which Germany interacts with its neighbors and brings different interests and views together. As long as German power is embedded in the EU, it is acceptable to Berlin’s European partners. EU countries share the same basic norms, and officials from all member states work together with their counterparts from other countries. Member states are closely involved in issues that in the past were purely domestic affairs of others. A network of cooperation spans the continent, reducing the relevance of national borders and providing an abundance of the most important resource in international relations: mutual trust.

THE COMING WAR FOR UKRAINE: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PROFERSSOR JOHN SCHINDLER

March 15, 2014 · by Fortuna's Corner 

From Naval War College Professor John Schindler on his XX Committee blog.
The Coming War for Ukraine
http://20committee.com/2014/ 03/14/the-coming-war-for- ukraine/

As I write, Russian forces, reportedly close to 100,000 troops, are massing on the eastern borders of Ukraine for a possible invasion. The Kremlin is either about to start a major war, or wants the world to think it is: there is no third choice now. Given the scheduled referendum in the Crimea this Sunday, smart money has it that Putin, if he really launches an all-out push for Ukraine – which, as I’ve already explained, could be a disastrous move on his part – it will come early next week. Needless to add, this scenario brings chills to me and to anyone who understands the stakes in what would immediately be the biggest European war since 1945.

Yet that invasion, with its terrible consequences, is what many in Ukraine now expect. That mood of resignation, and what a Russian invasion might look like, are elaborated well in a new piece in Novoye Vremya (The New Times), a Moscow newsmagazine that is a rare outlet for anti-Kremlin views in Russia. The article by Maksim Shveyts, titled “Kyiv: Expecting War,” follows in toto, with my analysis following.

Kyiv: Expecting War – Ukraine is forming a National Guard and preparing in earnest for the defense of the capital against the aggressor

In Kyiv, Russia’s possible plans to invade mainland Ukraine do not appear to anyone simply to be a fantasy. Many recall how during his latest “appearance to the people” in Rostov-na-Donu, ex-President Viktor Yanukovych once again said that he considers himself the legitimate head of state and also promised to return to Kyiv “soon”. The fugitive president could only do this accompanied by the Russian military, local experts are convinced. And, indeed, they do not rule out scenarios in which Russian tanks enter the city.

Vice Admiral Ihor Kabanenko, ex-deputy chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine General Staff, said that Russia is preparing an air and ground offensive frontal operation against the country. Testifying to this, Kabanenko says, will be the next steps of the Russian authorities: first, “the training of airborne forces of the Russian Federation led by General Shamanov with the involvement of strategic aviation. Second, completion of the formation of an echelon, massing of air defense, and the formation of an air defense force grouping. And, finally, continuation of a deep special operation on the territory of Ukraine and the buildup of a battle group in Crimea and the East.”

Kabanenko called on the country’s political leadership to immediately mobilize reserves and to arm the citizenry. This retired military officer is certain that it is necessary to declare a patriotic war against the occupiers, form a supreme command staff, and began armed resistance to Russia’s plans to invade mainland Ukraine.

Stanislav Shum, director of Ekonomika publishers, says, “the next city where Russian troops are to be expected is Kyiv”: “Because if the Ukrainian Army is as weak as the defense minister maintains, there’s no point from the military perspective in attacking the regions if the capital can be taken. Again, without a single shot being fired, to the cannonade of protests and profound concern of the West,” this expert believes. “Events subsequently will unfold as rapidly as in the final days of February, only in reverse order,” he explains.

Escalation of Tension

Kyiv really does have grounds for fears. On 13 March, the Russian Federation (RF) Defense Ministry announced exercises to be conducted on the eastern border with Ukraine. The same day in Inkerman [in Crimea], the Russian military sealed off a weapons depot. Two explosive ordnance storage units – of the Ukrainian Navy and Russia’s Black Sea Fleet – are stationed there. It was then learned that RF service personnel had sealed off the Ukrainian Ai-Petri Battalion. They posted thirty men with assault rifles around the perimeter and said that any transport traveling in the direction of the Ukrainian battalion was “subject to neutralization.” Meanwhile, the Crimean “self-defense force” prepared for an assault on the Ukrainian military unit in Simferopol, with the demand that the fuel depot be handed over to it. The new authorities of Crimea, led by the unrecognized Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov, have taken control of the Feodosiya oil transshipment terminal.

Cyber-war: In deed and desire, Iran emerging as a major power

Iran is being recognized in the US intelligence community and in cyber-security firms protecting corporate America as having vaulted into the top 10 of the world’s offensive cyber-powers. 
By Mark Clayton, Staff writer / March 16, 2014

A map is displayed on one of the screens at the Air Force Space Command Network Operations & Security Center at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. After years as a cyber also-ran, Iran is becoming a major threat in the rapidly evolving era of cyber-conflict.

As high-level international talks in Vienna over Iran’s nuclear program edged closer to a deal last fall, something curious happened – massive cyber-attacks that had hammered Wall Street bank websites repeatedly for about a year slowed to a near stop.

While banking industry officials were relieved, others wondered why those Iran-linked “distributed denial of service” attacks that had so regularly flooded bank websites with bogus Internet traffic were shut off like a faucet. One likely reason, say US experts on cyber-conflict: to reduce friction, at least temporarily, at the Vienna nuclear talks.

Yet, even as the “distributed denial of service” attacks abated for apparently diplomatic reasons, overall Iranian cyber-spying on US military and energy corporation networks has surged, these experts say.

Iran was fingered last fall, for instance, for infiltrating the US Navy Marine Corps Intranet. It then took the Navy nearly four months to root out the Iranian hackers infesting its largest unclassified computer network, the Wall Street Journal reported in February.

This litany of Iranian activity is evidence, say experts, that after years as a cyber also-ran, Iran is morphing swiftly into a major threat in the rapidly evolving era of cyber-conflict.

That shift is causing a growing recognition – from the halls of the US intelligence community to the cyber-security firms protecting corporate America – that Iran has vaulted into the ranks of the world’s top-10 offensive cyber-powers.

“Iran represents a qualitatively different cyber-actor,” says Ilan Berman, vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council, a Washington think tank. “They’re not stealing our intellectual property en masse like China, or using cyber-space as a black market like the Russians do. But what Iran does use cyber for, including elevating its retaliatory capabilities abroad, makes it a serious threat.”

Intent to do damage

While Iran is still not a true “cyber-superpower” on a par with the US, China, and Russia, it is the intensity, variety, and destructiveness of Iran-linked cyber-incursions over the past five years that led to its reappraisal.

“Until recently, the US intelligence community thought about America’s serious cyber-adversaries mainly as a duopoly – Russia and China,” says a cyber-expert who asked not to be named in order to preserve ties with federal agencies. “The Vienna process is causing Iran to rein in its cyber-activities, at least temporarily. Iran’s capabilities may be rudimentary in many ways, yet what it lacks in sophistication it more than makes up for in intent” to do damage.

Iran was suspected, for instance, to have been the hand behind a computer virus that wrecked 30,000 Saudi Aramco computers in 2012. A similar attack hit RasGas, a Qatari energy company, that same year.

Even though these attacks were considered relatively crude, Iran’s capabilities are believed to be growing rapidly, thanks to ample funding from its government – $1 billion in 2011 with continuing large annual expenditures – and easy access to Russian, Chinese and black market cyber-tools and expertise, experts say.

The Aramco incident, while not remotely as sophisticated as the landmark Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear fuel refining facilities in 2009, was “second only to Stuxnet as a disruptive cyber-attack and showed the progress of Iranian capabilities,” according to a recent study by James Lewis, a cyber-conflict expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

“They’ve put in place the structures, strategy – and have acquired software tools from the black market,” Dr. Lewis says in an interview. “They have groups whose job it is to hack. They’ve worked through the organization, the training, and strategic issues that let them use cyber-tools against their opponents.”

Another prong of Iran’s cyber-development is directed inward.

One of Iran’s most sophisticated hacks in 2011 infiltrated a Dutch company in order to steal digital certificates. Those certificates, used for secure online communications, were later reported to have been used by Iranian authorities to hack e-mail and communications of its own citizens.

“We’ve seen persistent activity by the Iranians, not only in cyber-espionage, but in attacking dissidents at home, infiltrating government and military targets, energy companies and the financial sector,” says Dmitri Alperovitch, cofounder and chief technical officer of the cyber-security firm CrowdStrike. “Most of that activity has continued pretty much unabated.”

Response to Stuxnet

For their part, Iranians say it took the US-linked Stuxnet attack to spur Tehran in 2009 to press for advanced cyber-war capability, Hossein Moussavian, a research scholar at Princeton and a former diplomat who served on Iran’s nuclear negotiations team, said in an appearance a year ago at Fordham Law School.

“The US, or Israel, or the Europeans, or all of them together, started war against Iran,” he told the audience. “Iran decided to have … to establish a cyber-army, and today, after four or five years, Iran has one of the most powerful cyber-armies in the world.”

Indeed, not unlike China, Iran appears to be developing its offensive cyber-capabilities as part of an asymmetric tool that can reach around the globe to counterbalance its relatively weak conventional forces, says Mr. Berman, of the American Foreign Policy Council. Notably, it seems more than willing to engage in damaging cyber-attacks wherever those might help achieve its goals on the world stage, he says.

That includes an uptick in Iran’s cyber-espionage sophistication – including the infiltration of the US Navy’s intranet network.

"It was a real eye-opener in terms of the capabilities of Iran to get into a Defense Department system and stay in there for months," a former US official told the Journal regarding the Navy intranet spying campaign. "That's worrisome."

A major part of Iran’s new capabilities are geared toward signaling the US, letting it know whether it is unhappy – or possibly smiling.

In that vein, massive Iran-linked “distributed denial of service” attacks had hit flooded bank websites with bogus Internet traffic about every three months since the fall of 2012. But as high-level international talks over Iran’s nuclear program edging closer to a deal late last fall, the huge bombardment stopped.

Iran and six world powers – the US, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany – reported agreement in January on a timetable for negotiating a comprehensive pact that would end the stalemate over Iran’s nuclear program.

DDoS attacks were 'a harbinger'

Of course DDoS attacks, like those against the big US banks, are not typically considered sophisticated attacks – more like protests that gum up the works than damaging attacks, experts note. Yet some say these were far bigger and more sophisticated than generally assumed.

“This operation took down some of the most admirable companies on Wall Street that had deployed some of the most sophisticated defensive technology – and the attackers were able to take down almost all of that,” says Carl Herberger, vice president of security solutions at Radware, an Israeli security firm that has investigated the denial of service attacks. “That’s a harbinger.”

Indeed, Wall Street’s respite from DDoS attacks could prove short-lived. If tensions resume or talks fail, cyber-attacks of all types directed at the US should be expected, several experts say.

“If the nuclear talks fail, we should expect retaliation from Iran in a variety of ways including cyber-attacks, both against the US, but also Saudi Arabia and others,” CrowdStrike’s Mr. Alperovitch says.

“It’s that willingness to display belligerence in the cyber realm that sets Iran apart,” says Jen Weedon, a manager in the threat intelligence division at the cyber-security firm Mandiant.

There’s another reason for the US and others to be wary of Iran as a growing cyber-threat. Iran is believed to be learning from the cyber-attacks against its own operations – and is actively reverse engineering them, some experts say.

Signs of this emerged in May 2012 when an Iranian cyber-engineer, Morteza Rezaei, an automation expert at NEDA Industrial Goup in Tehran, published his analysis of defending against Stuxnet in Control Global, a US online publication.

“It shows they're very competent, they're knowledgeable, and they have access to all of the latest solutions,” says Joe Weiss, an industrial control systems security expert who publishes Control Global. “It shows that that they're capable of doing to us what they think we did to them.”

Hayat Alvi, an associate professor of national security affairs at the US Naval War College concurs.

“When the Stuxnet virus hit their nuclear facilities it was a huge shock,” she says. “But clearly they’ve sent their tech savvy personnel to examine it and see what they can learn from it. I wouldn’t be too surprised if we see something potent like that from them in the not too distant future.”

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Cyber-Conflict-Monitor/2014/0316/Cyber-war-In-deed-and-desire-Iran-emerging-as-a-major-power

The real military game-changer: Hypersonic weapons 101

14 March 2014

Harry Kazianis, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute (University of Nottingham) and Managing Editor of the Washington, DC-based international affairs publication The National Interest interviewed John Stillion, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).

Q: Please describe what exactly a hypersonic weapon is, for our readers.

A: NASA defines the hypersonic regime as speeds greater than Mach 5 but less than Mach 25. It further divides this speed regime into two parts. One is the 'high-hypersonic' speed range between Mach 10 and Mach 25. The other is the range between Mach 5 and Mach 10 referred to simply as the hypersonic speed range (this is about 5300 to 10,600 kmh). The latter is the speed regime where most of the recent discussion of hypersonic weapons has been focused.

Ballistic missiles with ranges between about 300 and 1000 km travel in this speed range, but they generally don't travel long distances through the atmosphere at these speeds. Usually when hypersonic weapons are discussed people are referring to machines that can sustain flight in the Mach 5 to 10 speed range for a significant distance and period of time measured in minutes. For perspective, the Concorde supersonic transport cruised at Mach 2.

Q: What nations have the strongest hypersonic weapons programs? How advanced is American technology in this regard?

A: Press reports indicate there are only three nations with hypersonic weapons programs: the US, Russia and China.

In November 2011 the US Army conducted a successful test of the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) demonstrator. This is a hypersonic glide vehicle similar in concept to the reported Chinese system. A hypersonic glide vehicle couples the high speeds of ballistic missiles with the maneuverability of an aircraft. The goal of the AHW test was to collect data on hypersonic glide vehicle technologies to inform possible future designs. The test used a three-stage missile booster system to power the test vehicle to hypersonic speed and evaluated its performance on a flight over the Pacific Ocean.

A second US approach to hypersonic weapons made a similar advance on 1 May 2013 when the US successfully tested the Boeing X-51 hypersonic research vehicle (video above).

It is powered by a supersonic combustion ramjet or 'scramjet' engine and flew about 306 km in three and a half minutes at just over Mach 5. This was the first successful test of a scramjet-powered vehicle. The scramjet is efficient at hypersonic speeds, but as the name implies, the air flowing through the engine is traveling at supersonic speed, so the fuel must be precisely measured, injected into the air flow and ignited with extreme speed. Work on what eventually became the X-51 began in the early 1990s.

CYBER SPACE: WHAT IS IT, WHERE IS IT, AND WHO CARES?

March 14, 2014 · by Fortuna's Corner 

Cyberspace: What Is It, Where Is It and Who Cares?

http://www.armedforcesjournal. com/cyberspace-what-is-it- where-is-it-and-who-cares/

Signal and military intelligence NCOs watch for network attacks at the Army’s Cyber Operations Center at Fort Gordon, Ga. (Army/Michael L. Lewis)

By Brett Williams

Assured access to cyberspace is a key enabler of national security, so the answer to the question in the title is: we should all care. Two of the defining characteristics of a strong, modern, industrial nation are economic prosperity and a credible defense. The ability to use cyberspace has become indispensable to achieving both of these objectives.

Business and finance executives, as well as senior defense leaders, rely on cyberspace for exactly the same thing-to get information, move information and use information to make better decisions faster than the competition. Despite the importance of cyberspace, there continue to be senior leaders in both the private and public sectors who find themselves ill-equipped to deal with critical cyberspace issues. It is not uncommon to find that these leaders are comfortable providing strategic guidance regarding operations, resource allocation and personnel management across all of their areas of responsibility with the exception of cyberspace. There tends to be a lack of shared understanding between senior personnel who know they need cyberspace to be successful and the technical staffs charged with securing the networks, services and applications that make the organization run. The danger with this dynamic is the potential for de facto delegation of critical decisions to technical experts who do not have the education, training or experience to serve as senior leaders.

Cyberspace is complex, hard to visualize and – to many people – an esoteric concept that they do not need to comprehend. The best way to approach cyberspace at the executive level is to understand that cyberspace adds a new dimension to both economic competition and politically driven conflict, but the existence of cyberspace does not require a fundamental change in our strategic approach to either. This is a difficult premise to accept because “experts” have done a great job of advocating that cyberspace can only be understood by the most technically advanced among us. Becoming overly focused on the technical dimension, however, creates strategic inversion where the most senior leaders become inappropriately engaged with the tactical and technical details to the detriment of effective decision-making. Our senior executives and leaders do need to get a lot smarter about cyberspace, but they do not personally need the skills to configure a router or break an encrypted password. This article provides an executive overview of five cyberspace topics that may be useful to stimulate further exploration by those charged with providing and sustaining economic prosperity and national defense.

What You Can Learn By Studying a Person’s Metadata

My thanks to Dr. Martin Rudner for bringing this article to my attention.

MetaPhone: The sensitivity of telephone metadata

Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler

Homeland Security News Wire

March 14, 2014

Is telephone metadata sensitive? This is, at base, a factual dispute. Is it easy to draw sensitive inferences from phone metadata? How often do people conduct sensitive matters by phone, in a manner reflected by metadata? New research finds that phone metadata is unambiguously sensitive, even in a small population and over a short time window. The researchers were able to infer medical conditions, firearm ownership, and more, using solely phone metadata.

Is telephone metadata sensitive? The debate has taken on new urgency since last summer’s NSA revelations; all three branches of the federal government are now considering curbs on access. Consumer privacy concerns are also salient, as theFCC assesses telecom data sharing practices.

President Obama has emphasized that the NSA is “not looking at content.” “[T]his is just metadata,” Senator Feinstein told reporters. In dismissing the ACLU’s legal challenge, Judge Pauley shrugged off possible sensitive inferences as a “parade of horribles.”

On the other side, a number of computer scientists have expressed concern over the privacy risks posed by metadata. Ed Felten gave a particularly detailed explanation in a declaration for the ACLU: “Telephony metadata can be extremely revealing,” he wrote, “both at the level of individual calls and, especially, in the aggregate.” Holding the NSA’s program likely unconstitutional, Judge Leon credited this view and noted that “metadata from each person’s phone ‘reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”

This is, at base, a factual dispute. Is it easy to draw sensitive inferences from phone metadata? How often do people conduct sensitive matters by phone, in a manner reflected by metadata?

We used crowdsourced data to arrive at empirical answers. Since November, we have been conducting a study of phone metadata privacy. Participants run theMetaPhone app on their Android smartphone; it submits device logs and social network information for analysis. In previous posts, we have used the MetaPhone dataset to spot relationships, understand call graph interconnectivity, andestimate the identifiability of phone numbers.

At the outset of this study, we shared the same hypothesis as our computer science colleagues — we thought phone metadata could be very sensitive. We did not anticipate finding much evidence one way or the other, however, since the MetaPhone participant population is small and participants only provide a few months of phone activity on average.

We were wrong. We found that phone metadata is unambiguously sensitive, even in a small population and over a short time window. We were able to infer medical conditions, firearm ownership, and more, using solely phone metadata.

Methodology

We began by identifying the MetaPhone participants’ contacts. We used the same approach as in our prior work on number identifiability, matching phone numbers against the public Yelp and Google Places directories. In total, our 546 participants contacted 33,688 unique numbers. 6,107 of those numbers (18 percent) resolved to an identity.

Next, we labeled the contacts that appeared related to a sensitive activity or trait. In most instances, an organization’s line of business was apparent from its name. Where there was ambiguity, we used simple Google queries to learn more.

We present two sets of results. First, we provide an analysis of individual calls to sensitive numbers. Second, we relate several patterns of calls to emphasize the detail available in telephone metadata.

The U.S. Intelligence Community’s Big Data Problem

The intelligence community’s big-data problem

Frank Konkel
March 13, 2014

The intelligence community is perhaps the most innovative data collector on the planet, with each of its 17 agencies able to siphon off various pools of information from nearly any source.

Yet the IC collects voluminous amounts of mostly fragmented data, and therein lies a challenge every other body in government struggling to make use of big data can relate to.

“In our world, we’re very good at collecting data, we’re also pretty good at analyzing it – we have to quickly parse out what is valuable,” Roger Hockenberry, a former chief technology officer for the Central Intelligence Agency, said during a panel session March 11 at the Symantec Government Symposium in Washington.

“Our data is always fragmented, and we’re trying to make sense of fragmented data options, which is extremely difficult,” said Hockenberry, who is now a consultant. “How we analyze every piece of data, how we reprocess it to continue to make better sense of what is going on – that is the biggest we have, especially when we can’t get complete databases.”

Former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden’s public disclosures of classified information have highlighted how the NSA and other agencies collect various sorts of signals intelligence. A significant amount of this data doesn’t come packaged neatly for ingestion and analysis in any open-source or proprietary platform. Social media feeds and emails, for example, represent large but highly unstructured datasets. To “normalize” that kind of unstructured data in a way that it becomes useful continues to be a major challenge, Hockenberry said.

To conduct its large-scale analytics effectively, the CIA uses a mixture of open-source and commercial products built off a data-science oriented reference architecture that sprung up from one of its small labs in the past decade. The CIA started with OpenStack and added commercial products in various places to note differences and build an effective and scalable solution.

Hockenberry said platforms and tools differ in usefulness depending on the environment in which they’re operating, and that logic also carries over to the post-analytic visualizations a dataset produces.

“You have to decide the right mix,” said Hockenberry, adding that big data forces analysts or data scientists to be creative in how they ask questions.

The intelligence community is at the forefront of big data as a technology, but even at its most effective levels, analyzing piles of unstructured, fragmented data is challenging. Algorithms will improve and data holders will inevitably learn to ask better questions of data, yet as the deluge of unstructured information continues to pour forth, finding meaningful signal in the noise is likely to remain problematic for some time.

“It’d be nice if al-Qaeda would ship us all their records in a nice, standard format, but they don’t,” Hockenberry said

Cyber attack on Russia hits India, secret defence documents leaked


Hindustan Times 
March 08, 2014

First Published: 21:03 IST(8/3/2014) | Last Updated: 07:34 IST(9/3/2014)

A cyber attack on Russian communication systems by anonymous hackers on early Saturday morning has compromised India's defence dealings with Russia and raised serious concerns about a possible major security breach.

Believed to have been carried out by an international group of anonymous hackers in retaliation to the last week's Russian invasion of Ukraine, the attack was detected by Indian technical intelligence agencies at about 4am on Saturday.

Most of the leaked documents relate to India's dealings with Russia for the purchase, overhaul and repair of front-line fighter aircraft like the Sukhoi-30 MKI and the MiG-29.

They include correspondence between Russia's United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which makes the SU-30 and MiG-29 among other aircraft, and the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) which manufactures the aircraft under license in India.

The offices of the defence ministry and national security advisor were alerted after the breach was detected, said an official familiar with the development.

However, Bangalore-based HAL spokesperson Gopal Sutar told HT he couldn't comment because they had not been informed till Saturday evening. Sutar, however, confirmed that some of the documents mentioned by HT to him seemed authentic.

Several letters written by UAC president M Pogosyan to HAL chairman RK Tyagi refer to a host of issues discussed during the 31st session of Indo-Russian Subgroup on Aviation (IRSA) held in New Delhi on February 20 this year. The IRSA is a sub-group of the Indo-Russian Inter Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation.

Some of these letters discuss the delays in finalising a contract between UAC and HAL for the RD-33 MK engines, which power the MiG-29 fighter aircraft.

Electronic Weapons: American IRST Finally Catches Up

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/articles/20140315.aspx

March 15, 2014: 

On February 11th the U.S. Navy had its first flight test of a new IRST (Infa-Red Search & Track) pod. IRST uses a high resolution infrared (heat sensing) radar to positively spot and identify a potential aerial target This is done by comparing what IRST sees to 3-D models of known aircraft stored in the pod computer. This is similar to the ATFLIR (Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared) pods used to spot surface targets.

FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared Radar) has been around since the 1980s, and as the technology became more powerful, it was possible to spot and identify targets at longer ranges. The ATFLIR can identify ground targets from 20 kilometers away, and the latest IRST systems have an even longer range. It eventually became possible to use FLIR, in the form of IRST, as a sensor for spotting aircraft. This was a big advantage because FLIR is passive. It doesn't broadcast, like normal radar, thus the target cannot detect those radar transmissions, and be alerted that it is being "painted" by a hostile radar.

The navy is playing catch-up by equipping some of its F-18E fighters with the new generation of IRST. Russian and European fighters (MiG-29, Su-30, Eurofighter, Rafale) have long had IRST. For the Russians, this was seen as a way to deal with stealthy American aircraft. The U.S. stealth warplanes were built to defeat radar. But these stealthy aircraft still gave off heat and IRST works by seeking out heat. The navy already has some aircraft equipped with an IRST pod based on the technology used in the older F-14D IRST. But newer IRST technology is pitched as being much more effective, giving warnings (that something is out there) at long range (several hundred kilometers). The new generation IRST is also able to spot targets on the ground or at sea. 

The U.S. Air Force is not as enthusiastic about IRST. In 2011, as an economy move, and because of unspecified "technical problems", the U.S. Air Force dropped all efforts to equip any of its F-15C fighters with IRST. This includes an effort, begun in 2009, to equip a hundred F-15Cs with heat sensing pods once used to equip navy F-14Ds (which were retired in 2006). The refurbished navy IRST pods would have enabled the F-15s to detect and track aircraft, over a hundred kilometers away, from the heat the target aircraft give off. IRST is a passive (it does not broadcast) sensor, thus it is undetectable by the enemy.

U.S. Intelligence Community Trying to Rebrand Itself

March 14, 2014
How the US intelligence community attempts to rebrand itself – on Tumblr
Spencer Ackerman
The Guardian

Critics have argued the documents on the site are most often presented without critical disclosures. Photograph: IC On The Record

Amie Stepanovich was doubly rewarded when she won her transparency lawsuit against the US government. Not only did Stepanovich, formerly a lawyer for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, receive some of the surveillance documents she sued to obtain, but the office of the director of national intelligence credited her effort on its Tumblr.


That Tumblr is one of the centerpieces of the intelligence community’s attempts at rebranding in the wake of what it considers a crisis wrought by Edward Snowden: a web clearinghouse of formerly classified documents related to the National Security Agency’s sweeping surveillance authorities, an exercise in transparency.

But the documents on the site are most often presented without a critical disclosure. While statements accompanying them refer to decisions by director James Clapper and other administration officials to release the surveillance-related information, nearly all the instances of such declassification – eight out of 12 – came to be published only after the government lost transparency cases, a fact that the Tumblr, known as IC On The Record, most often omits or obscures.

“All along, in reaction to the disclosures made by Snowden, the administration and corresponding agencies have acted like they’ve wanted to engage on conversations related to these topics for a long time, and these were coming and they were preparing to reveal information to the public, but there’s no evidence that would’ve happened without the stimulus provided by Edward Snowden releasing a lot of documents about government surveillance,” said Stepanovich.

Stepanovich’s case is the exception – and, perhaps, the new rule.

On March 4, IC On The Record released information detailing how many times the government requested and received authorization to use devices that secretly log incoming and outgoing telephone calls. It prominently credited the Electronic Privacy Information Center (Epic) lawsuit.

Ambush at Tongpal: History Repeats Itself


In his book “The Life of Reason”, George Santayana, the Spanish American philosopher observed, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”. This statement, made in the larger historical context, has equal applicability to conflict situations. If operational lessons are not correctly learned, casualties will continue to occur with monotonous regularity. The Maoist ambush of police personnel in Chhattisgarh on 11 March 2014is yet another chilling reminder of the truism of Santayana’s words. 

A 45 man strong police party left their post at Tongpal on the morning of the 11thto sanitise the area. Moving north along the road, the Maoists ambushed the group about three kilometres from their start point, killing 16 people, 11 of whom were from the CRPF, four from the local police and one civilian. The Maoists used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small arms to cause casualties, and post the encounter, made away with 18 rifles, a few under barrel grenade launchers and a large number of magazines from the ambushed police party. It is evident that no lessons were learnt from the earlier ambushat Km 43 carried out by the Maoists on 25 May 2013 in which 31 people were killed, including a major part of the state level leadership of the Congress party.The recent ambush of 11thMarch was about 15 km form the Km 43 ambush site and was in open terrain. The area comes under the responsibility of the CRPF at Tongpal, which invites the question as to why no lessons were learntfrom past operations? Perhaps the answer lies in the way we record incidents, especially those where hostile forces have got the better of the security forces. The right questions are invariably never asked, unpleasant facts are covered up and accountability rarely established. In deference to those who have laid down their lives, statements are given to the media on the brave resistance put up by the security forces.So history repeats itself, not because it has been forgotten, but because we failed to record it correctly in the first place, leading to continuous loss of life and a further cycle of cover-ups and misreporting. 

A question to be asked is, ‘was the area under the domination of the security forces’? The answer unfortunately is in the negative. While the police forces do dominate the area by day, the area is left to the Maoists by night. Domination requires patrolling by night also and setting up ambushes where movement of Maoists is likely.Such ambush sites are chosen randomly, to avoid the pitfall of falling into a fixed and predictable routine. Only then can caution be imposed on the Maoists. In the present ambush, the Maoists came by night in large numbers and set up IEDs on the road. Evidently, they had a free run to do so! So the questions to be asked with respect to area domination are; does the CRPF carry out night patrolling? Are they trained to do so? Do they have the requisite night vision equipment? Do they set up ambushes at random to prevent the move of armed militant groups? Unless we ask these questions, how can we even hope to improve the quality of our response? 

Asian Strategic Review 2014: US Pivot and Asian Security


Editor

2014

Publisher: Pentagon Press

ISBN 978-81-8274-769-2

Price: Rs. 995 [Download E-Book]
About the Book

The “Pivot to Asia” strategy qualifies to be called Obama Doctrine: a part of Obama’s “grand strategy”. This policy may radically redefine not only the US engagement with Asia but also the Asian strategic dynamics. The initiative is packaged comprehensively and has all the necessary components of a strategy, namely military, political, economic and ideological. The strategy may also be seen as an attempt to address the China challenge, or the China dilemma, given its critical role on a number of issues in the region and its growing military modernisation. This book looks at various facets of the pivot strategy, to include US, Chinese, regional and country specific perspectives with an aim of providing greater clarity and understanding.

Contents

US PIVOT AND ASIAN SECURITY

Stealth Technology and its Effect on Aerial Warfare

IDSA Monograph Series No. 33
2014

In aerial warfare technology has progressed rapidly from the frail and flimsy machines seen in the air in the first half of the twentieth century. In the jet age that started soon after World War-II military aviation initially expanded into higher speeds and multirole capabilities. In the early 1970s the concept of making military aircraft more difficult to detect gained the attention of design and development teams. Since then the world has seen the F-117 “Nighthawk”, the world's first stealth or “low observable” fighter. This was followed shortly by the F-22 “Raptor” and F-35 “Lightning-II”. The performance of the F-117 in the Gulf War of 1991 and in Kosovo made it clear that stealth was a revolutionary technology. Programmes to make stealth aircraft thereafter commenced in other parts of the world as well with the Russians developing the PAK FA and PAK DA, China working on the J-20, J-31, and “sharp sword” Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV), and India working on the Advanced Medium Combat aircraft (AMCA), Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) and Autonomous Unmanned Research aircraft (AURA). Stealth has been seen as practically invincible by the lay public. However, an understanding of how stealth technology works and an examination of the possible means of countering stealth aircraft help come to a more balanced understanding of this important technology. This monograph attempts to commence this task of explaining stealth technology, looking at possible counters to stealth and discussing the ways in which stealth technology changes the conduct of aerial warfare.

About the Author

Group Captain Vivek Kapur is a serving Indian Air Force fighter pilot. He has extensive experience in fighter flying, operational command, as well as in training appointments. He has worked as a Research Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) in the past and was a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) during 2012 and 2013. He is currently a Senior Fellow at CAPS. Gp. Capt. Kapur holds a M.Sc. degree in Defence and strategic Studies from Madras University as well as an MBA from Delhi University, and is pursuing a Doctoral degree at the school of International Studies (SIS) at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi.

Congressional Research Service reports

New or updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has withheld from online public access include the following.

March 5, 2014



16 March 2014

The sinking feeling over Indian navy

String of recent accidents has put a question mark over the state of health of the fleet.

06 Mar 2014

Ajai Shukla writes on strategic affairs, defence and diplomacy. He is a former army colonel, and now based in New Delhi. 


The recent spate of fatal accident have brought the effectiveness of the navy into question [File: Reuters] 

Since the turn of the century, India has invested heavily in building the navy it needs for dominating the northern Indian Ocean, a crucial maritime highway for the flow of hydrocarbons from West Asia to China, Japan and the Southeast Asian countries; and for the transportation to Europe of merchandise from those manufacturing economies.

With China's military a looming presence on its Himalayan border with Tibet, New Delhi has long derived strategic assurance from its potential stranglehold over China’s sea lines of communication, or SLOCs, as these maritime highways are termed.

Follow our special India coverage 

Over the last seven months, however, a spate of accidents involving Indian Navy warships has placed a question mark over this capability.

On February 26, the navy chief, Admiral Devendra Kumar Joshi, resigned after an accident in which two officers were killed and five sailors seriously injured while fighting a fire in INS Sindhuratna, one of the navy's nine Russian Kilo-class submarines.

This was not the first such incident. On August 14 last year, a catastrophic explosion inside INS Sindhurakshak, another Kilo-class submarine that was berthed in Mumbai, killed all 18 sailors on board and sunk the vessel. 

The surface fleet has been as accident-prone. In 2011, a frigate sank after colliding with a merchant vessel.

Indian Army: Reminiscences of a Soldier

14 Mar , 2014

No matter how hi-tech the modern battlefield gets. No matter how powerful the Drones and the Robots become. The mission of the Infantry will continue to close-in and destroy the enemy, through close quarters violent combat in any war operation. This old Infantry saying will never be outdated, “When it was victory, the Cavalier claimed it outright, the Gunner boasted of his calibre but the Infantryman stood silent with victory at his feet.”

Effective and precision firepower with integrated 24×7 all-weather surveillance holds the key to success in any challenge on the LoC.

I had an implausible career spanning of over twenty years as a hard core Infantry soldier. I commanded 9 SIKH LI, the same battalion that I was commissioned into. Like most of the Infantrymen, I hold a distinction of serving in almost all types of terrain that India has to offer. My operational career include tenures at the world’s highest battlefield, the Siachen Glacier, Eastern Ladakh opposite the Chinese on the Line of Actual control (LAC), two active Line-of-Control (LoC) tenures against the Pakistanis; one at Tangdar in Kupwara district and another at Mendhar in Poonch district. My soldiering skills were honed in the years 1998 to 2000. It was a battle of nerves playing the deadly cat and mouse game day in and day out with the Laskar-e-Toiba and the Hizbul Mujahedeen in the Kashmir valley.

During the command of my battalion, my unit pioneered the conversion of the 91 Infantry Brigade to an amphibious Brigade. We showcased India’s new offensive amphibious capabilities to the world in 2009 by successfully conducting joint services Exercise “TROPEX” off the Gujarat coast.

From mid-2009 to early 2011, I commanded a battalion in lower Assam in the North East and fought the pugnacious ULFA insurgents. As a battalion during this period, we participated in a number of exercises on the LAC in the desolate mountains of Arunachal Pradesh. I also had an exposure to the Desert Warfare during my service. In the offensive role, I have participated in desert military war games or the exercises as we call them.

As I scroll through my memory and reminisce about my military past, recollecting various roles and tasks performed in the length and breadth of India’s landmass, there was always a desire for specialised equipment and weapons. As I read about various modern military weapons and equipment available today, I wonder if I had a few of those wonder tools, my task would have been far easier.