How to Fight the US Navy on the Cheap

National Interest  |  James Holmes

Ukraine has effectively utilized shore-based drones and anti-ship missiles to disrupt Russian logistical operations in the Sea of Azov, demonstrating how asymmetric capabilities can neutralize a superior naval force. By targeting the Russian shadow fleet, Kyiv has imposed a non-naval blockade that forces the evacuation of the Crimean Peninsula and degrades Russian energy infrastructure.

This tactical shift reflects a broader global trend where inexpensive, autonomous technology and AI-driven systems enable coastal states to achieve anti-access and area-denial objectives against traditional maritime powers. The erosion of the international maritime legal order, compounded by aggressive assertions of control over transit corridors by actors like Iran and China, necessitates a reevaluation of how the United States projects power into Eurasian rimlands. As defense becomes increasingly dominant, the U.S. Navy faces significant risks to its ability to command marginal seas, potentially complicating future power projection and regional security operations.

Comment

The proliferation of low-cost, shore-based anti-access capabilities necessitates a shift in naval doctrine from platform-centric force projection to distributed maritime operations. Reliance on high-value surface combatants becomes increasingly untenable when littoral adversaries can leverage swarming autonomous systems to achieve saturation attacks. For the Indian Navy, this trend underscores the urgency of integrating directed-energy weapons and advanced electronic warfare suites into the Eastern Naval Command's defensive posture to secure the Bay of Bengal. Maintaining maritime domain awareness against non-state actors and regional competitors now requires a robust, multi-layered sensor network capable of identifying and neutralizing small-signature threats before they reach the engagement envelope.

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