Beyond prototypes: Army readies operational NGC2 tech for I Corps

Breaking Defense | Mark Pomerleau

The US Army is moving the Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) system from its stage of prototype testing into operational deployment with the I Corps, a formation focused on the Pacific. The transition will start in October 2026 and will involve a software update aimed at giving rise to a 'fight tonight' capability over large maritime distances, the system functioning as a joint multinational data router.

To scale this open architecture to the corps level it is necessary to reduce the software footprint from the forty-five applications that were tested by the 4th Infantry Division down to a streamlined set of core and common services. Interoperability is still the main challenge. During Super Garuda Shield the 4th Infantry Division managed to integrate NGC2 kits onto Coast Guard fast response cutters and carried out enroute mission command on C-17 aircraft. In order to support these activities the Army has chosen Anduril to lead the development of the common data layer. This highly decentralised data architecture is intended to give subordinate Pacific units the ability to have tailorable operational command flexibility in complex multi-domain operations.

Comment

The introduction of the Next Generation Command and Control system into I Corps highlights a basic conflict in the integration of modern joint forces. Although the system is designed to link up real-time sensor-shooter data throughout the Pacific, its dependence on Anduril's common data layer leads to weaknesses in contested electronic environments. Experience gained during Super Garuda Shield showed that attaching these systems to Coast Guard fast response cutters gave rise to tactical flexibility. Yet the ability to keep this connection going across the Lombok Strait in the absence of dedicated military-grade satellite constellations has not been proven.

There is likely to be operational friction which will cause a review to be carried out into the way that subordinate units, for example the 25th Infantry Division, handle local data feeds. Should Anduril's common data layer not manage the task of filtering out redundant targeting data, tactical commanders will be at risk of experiencing cognitive overload when engaged in intense operations. As a result, the "fight tonight" capabilities included in the software update released in October 2026 will not be achieved if I Corps is unable to establish high-bandwidth links while being subjected to jamming.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How then can the I Corps preserve decentralised mission command if the common data layer of Anduril is not able to reliably filter sensor-shooter data while electronic jamming is taking place?

The fact that the data layer operated by Anduril had failed would mean that I Corps would have to use the engagement authorities which had been preassigned to it and the emission-control procedures as well. I believe that subordinate units such as the 25th Infantry Division would be forced into working within small, semi-independent areas, thereby greatly reducing the degree to which synchronised multi-domain operations planned for the Pacific theatre could be carried out. This change would in the end reveal the shortcomings of software-defined command systems when facing peer-state electronic warfare capabilities.

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