Iran’s Second Front: The Houthis’ Bold Advance Has Transformed the Middle East’s Wars

Foreign Affairs | April Longley Alley and Allison Minor

The Houthis have launched a major military offensive in Yemen, capturing the strategic port of Mokha and Perim Island at the Bab el Mandeb Strait. This rapid advance threatens to disrupt global energy markets by allowing the Iranian-aligned group to restrict Saudi oil exports through the Red Sea.

The escalation follows the collapse of a 2022 truce after Saudi forces bombed the Sanaa airport runway to block an Iranian flight. By targeting shipping near Yanbu, the group has effectively opened a second front in the Iran war, causing Saudi oil exports through the strait to plummet 95 percent. Riyadh's unified command remains deeply fractured. Despite launching Operation Rough Rider in 2025, the United States has hesitated to expand its military involvement. Consequently, the group is poised to demand maximalist concessions, including war reparations, while cementing their role as regional gatekeepers alongside Tehran.

Comment

The failure of Islamabad and Ankara to intervene militarily despite the Mecca mutual defence agreement exposes the limits of Riyadh's security diversification. Pakistan restricted its response to diplomatic warnings to Tehran rather than deploying assets to secure the Bab el Mandeb. Turkey similarly avoided direct involvement, leaving the newly formed 14-country naval coalition without operational teeth. This inaction reveals that Riyadh's bilateral defence pacts with non-Arab partners cannot substitute for the direct maritime security guarantees historically provided by the US Navy's Fifth Fleet.

The operational paralysis of the Mecca accord stems from the divergent geopolitical priorities of its signatories. For Pakistan, avoiding a military confrontation with neighbouring Iran outweighs its financial dependency on Saudi Arabia. Turkey prioritises its own maritime footprint in the Horn of Africa over active combat operations against Houthi forces in Mokha. Consequently, the Mecca accord is unlikely to trigger Turkish or Pakistani naval deployments to counter Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles near Perim Island.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If the Mecca mutual defence agreement fails to generate active naval deployments to protect shipping near Perim Island, what does this reveal about the limits of non-Western security alliances in the Red Sea?

The pattern suggests that non-Western security pacts like the Mecca accord are primarily designed for political deterrence rather than operational power projection. Without integrated command structures or shared threat perceptions regarding Iran, signatories like Pakistan and Turkey will likely limit their involvement to diplomatic mediation. Consequently, the burden of maritime security in the Bab el Mandeb will continue to fall on unilateral actions by the US Navy or local proxy forces.

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