The US military’s next significant challenge: Hiding

Military Times | Eve Sampson

In response to the devastating Iranian missile and drone attacks on U.S. bases in the Middle East, the American military is now revising its tactical doctrine with a greater emphasis on remaining concealed on the battlefield. The accurate strikes, such as the one carried out in February 2026 on the Naval Support Activity Bahrain in Bahrain which resulted in $400 million worth of damage, have revealed the weaknesses of large and concentrated command centres.

The fact that American forces have enjoyed uncontested air superiority in both Iraq and Afghanistan has meant that they have been able to carry out operations from highly visible base locations without having to worry about being hit by precision strikes. Yet the increasing availability of cheap one-way attack drones and long-range weaponry has weakened this security. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies has stated, intense defensive actions have used up 65 per cent of the Patriot and 38 per cent of the THAAD interceptor stocks. Instead of focusing on efficiency, the forces are now prioritising survival. As a result, the Army's Combined Arms Command is teaching units how to reduce the size of their command posts, control their electromagnetic signatures, and make use of scattered logistics centres such as Diego Garcia in order to keep operations going.

Comment

Shifting from concentrated hubs such as Naval Support Activity Bahrain to a highly dispersed system of operating bases has a fundamental effect on maritime logistics. When distant places like Diego Garcia are used, there is a severe amount of operational difficulty since the supply lines are lengthened by more than 2,000 miles. This geographical separation causes carrier strike groups to have to plan for their sustainment needs weeks ahead of time, which in turn reduces their tactical flexibility in situations involving a changing threat.

As a result, the decline of Patriot and THAAD interceptor systems in the Middle East region is likely to speed up since the dispersed units need their own air defence coverage. The breaking up of Patriot batteries reduces the overall level of protection available in the area, making the smaller logistic detachments at Port Shuaiba especially susceptible to attacks by drone swarms. In the end, the US Navy's dependence on the Diego Garcia atoll in the Indian Ocean for resupply will hamper its ability to carry out rapid responses during extended regional situations.

Strategic Question for Discussion

What effect does the logistical delay caused by having to rely on Diego Garcia for sustainment have on the operational readiness of US Navy carrier strike groups when involved in intense maritime conflicts in the Persian Gulf?

The evidence currently available indicates a serious decline in operational readiness since a supply route spanning 2,000 miles makes it impossible to quickly replace critical munitions and stores. I believe that carrier strike groups will have to either accept higher risk levels or reduce the length of time they spend in the Persian Gulf in order to prevent logistical exhaustion. The fact that this situation exists shows that extended operations will increasingly rely on setting up secret, intermediate staging areas nearer to the theatre.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here