Is the U.S. Army Backing Off on Drones?

Council on Foreign Relations | Michael C. Horowitz

The U.S. Army faces growing scrutiny over its commitment to integrating uncrewed systems following several high-profile setbacks in mid-2026. During the Combined Resolve exercise in Hohenfels, Germany, the 3rd Armoured Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, was decisively outperformed by highly experienced Ukrainian drone units operating in contested electromagnetic environments.

This operational deficit coincides with the service phasing out a specialised European-based airborne infantry battalion dedicated to drone experimentation. Leadership transitions further complicate this trajectory. The resignation of Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll, champion of the Army Transformation Initiative, leaves a leadership void. While Acting Chief of Staff General Christopher LaNeve emphasises basic soldiering, Pentagon initiatives like the Drone Dominance Program and a projected $55 billion budget for the Defence Autonomous Warfare Group in fiscal year 2027 could offset these institutional shifts. Ultimately, rapid tactical adoption remains critical to maintaining a modern competitive edge.

Comment

The performance of the 3rd Armoured Brigade Combat Team during the Combined Resolve exercise reveals a deep-seated friction between traditional heavy force structures and the realities of small-unit uncrewed aviation. While the U.S. Army has historically relied on centralised, high-value assets for reconnaissance and strike, the Hohenfels simulation demonstrates that decentralised, low-cost drone networks can rapidly paralyse conventional armoured manoeuvres. This disparity indicates that armoured proficiency at Hohenfels is no longer merely a function of platform survivability or firepower. Instead, the 1st Cavalry Division's operational success increasingly depends on the rapid dissemination of electronic warfare capabilities and organic aerial sensing down to the squad level.

Consequently, the dissolution of the specialised airborne infantry battalion in Europe will likely delay the integration of these tactical lessons across the wider force. Without dedicated experimental formations to bridge the gap between technological acquisition and field doctrine, standard combat units will struggle to internalise the rapid software and tactical update cycles seen in Ukraine. This institutional bottleneck threatens to dilute the impact of large-scale funding initiatives like the Defence Autonomous Warfare Group by failing to translate raw procurement into cohesive battlefield manoeuvres.

Strategic Question for Discussion

How will the U.S. Army reconcile the tactical deficits observed during Combined Resolve with the massive procurement goals of the Defence Autonomous Warfare Group if it lacks dedicated experimental units to test these systems?

The pattern suggests that without specialised units like the recently dissolved airborne battalion, the U.S. Army will struggle to convert raw procurement from the Defence Autonomous Warfare Group into usable battlefield doctrine. My assessment is that this institutional gap will result in a mismatch where advanced uncrewed systems are fielded to conventional brigades that lack the organic electronic warfare and software integration capabilities demonstrated during Combined Resolve. Consequently, the service may find itself with abundant technology but stagnant tactical execution.

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