Two alliances just failed Saudi Arabia. Then they called Trump

Washington Examiner | Emzari Gelashvili

Houthi forces seized complete control of the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait after capturing Mokha, Dhubab, and Perim Island following missile and drone strikes against four Saudi cities that wounded 73 civilians. The swift offensive abruptly severed crucial Red Sea trade routes, sending Brent crude prices soaring near $108 per barrel.

Despite the recent signing of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, mutual defence partners Pakistan and Turkey provided no military assistance to Riyadh. Facing additional drone strikes against its East-West oil pipeline from Iraqi territory, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman requested direct American military intervention. President Trump declined the request, prioritising naval focus on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz while offering intelligence support instead. The Houthis subsequently instituted a selective blockade, granting de facto immunity to Chinese-flagged vessels while targeting Saudi-linked shipping. Treaties proved ineffective. Washington chose operational restraint over opening a second front ahead of high-level diplomatic summitry with Beijing.

Comment

The political collapse of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement during the Houthi capture of Perim Island demonstrates the structural limits of regional security pacts lacking integrated command structures. While Saudi Arabia relied on treaty partners for diplomatic mediation with Tehran, neither Ankara nor Islamabad possessed the expeditionary capability or political mandate required to contest anti-access/area-denial networks in the Bab el-Mandeb. Consequently, formal guarantees under the Mecca pact without pre-delegated targeting authority or forward-deployed assets in Jazan function as diplomatic instruments rather than operational deterrents.

This operational deficit shifts the burden of Red Sea security back onto bilateral arrangements with US Central Command, despite Washington's explicit refusal to authorise air strikes around Mokha. In response, Riyadh will likely bypass broad coalition frameworks to pursue transactional, platform-specific procurement of F-15 and Typhoon armaments alongside targeted intelligence-sharing agreements.

Strategic Question for Discussion

Which factor presents a greater obstacle to coalition cohesion in the Red Sea — the absence of pre-delegated targeting authority within the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, or the refusal of US Central Command to authorise offensive strikes near Mokha?

The refusal of US Central Command to authorise offensive strikes around Mokha represents the more critical structural obstacle, as regional partners cannot replicate American intelligence and deep-strike capabilities. While the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement revealed clear political limitations, Saudi operational dependency on Washington ultimately dictates whether anti-access networks in the Bab el-Mandeb can be effectively dismantled. The trajectory indicates that without explicit US operational backing, collective defence guarantees remain largely symbolic in high-intensity coastal conflict.

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