20 November 2026

A Former Pakistani Army Captain Now Commands the BLA

The Diplomat | Rizwan Naseer

Rahman Gul took command of the Baloch Liberation Army on November 14, replacing Bashir Zeb following the high-casualty failure of Operation Herof 2 in early 2026. The former Pakistan Army captain previously commanded the insurgent group's Majeed Brigade suicide unit after completing eight years of service in Waziristan and on the Line of Control.

Zeb was ousted after the six-day January-February offensive produced heavy insurgent losses against state forces. Gul is shifting tactics toward small mobile cells. This dispersal aims to evade detection while sustaining long-term operations across Balochistan, where quarterly violence deaths surged to 829 in late 2026. Targeting remains concentrated against Chinese personnel and infrastructure, building on 14 attacks that killed 20 Chinese nationals between 2021 and 2024. Islamabad is leveraging foreign mining investments, including a 1.3 billion dollar American venture at Reko Diq and Chinese operations at Saindak, to secure dual counterterrorism assistance.

Comment

The insertion of a conventionally trained officer into the command structure of the Baloch Liberation Army alters the internal mechanics of irregular warfare in the region. Military experience gained in state armed forces enables commanders to convert loosely structured insurgent cadres into disciplined cells capable of decentralised execution. Within the Majeed Brigade, this transition shifts command authority down to autonomous field elements while preserving centralised target selection. Tactical decisions move closer to the point of friction, reducing reliance on electronic communications prone to interception by the Inter-Services Intelligence.

This operational decentralisation directly challenges the territorial control methods employed by the Pakistan Army's XII Corps in Quetta. By delegating execution to small, self-sustaining units, insurgent leadership insulates field cadres from decapitation strikes aimed at senior commanders. Standard decapitation strategies lose efficacy when localised cell structures maintain operational momentum independently across the chokepoints of Gwadar.

Strategic Question for Discussion
How far can the Pakistan Army's XII Corps adapt its fixed intelligence and area-denial doctrine when facing insurgent forces operating through decentralised cells like the Majeed Brigade?
The available evidence points toward severe friction between conventional area-denial tactics and autonomous cell structures. Standard intelligence gathering through signals interception by state agencies yields diminishing returns against small units enforcing strict emission security. Conventional formations are therefore likely forced to rely heavily on human intelligence networks, which remain vulnerable to counter-intelligence measures within local communities.
Share your assessment in the comments below.
💬
Ask me
Ask Strategic Study India New chat ×