20 November 2026

Trump, Xi, and Putin at APEC Summit: Arms Control Long Shot, Ukraine Longer Shot

19FortyFive | Robert E. Kelly

United States President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in Shenzhen during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit to discuss nuclear weapons and Iran while excluding Ukraine from the formal agenda. The expiration of the New START treaty without a successor leaves a dangerous bilateral arms control vacuum as Beijing expands its nuclear inventory toward an estimated 620 warheads.

Negotiating a trilateral framework faces steep structural hurdles because Moscow treats its massive arsenal as a core pillar of great power status while demanding the inclusion of British and French warheads. Beijing similarly rejects participation in disarmament talks that would freeze its strategic forces into permanent inferiority relative to Washington and Moscow. Abu Dhabi talks on the ongoing war in Ukraine recently deadlocked over territorial demands, leaving a diplomatic settlement unlikely.

Comment

Bilateral strategic stability architectures break down when a third nuclear-armed peer scales its force structure to parity with the existing superpowers. The 2010 New START verification regime relied on predictable bilateral counting rules that cannot easily accommodate an expanding People's Liberation Army Rocket Force inventory without restructuring inspection protocols. Beijing faces few incentives to freeze intermediate-range ballistic missile production while Washington maintains an extensive forward-deployed missile defence network in the Western Pacific.

Expanding this calculus to a trilateral treaty requires reconciling disparate force structures and verification regimes that were never designed for a three-body nuclear problem. Historical arms control precedents such as the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty managed parity between two actors, but multilateralizing those verification mechanisms encounters immediate friction over divergent telemetry-sharing standards.

Strategic Question for Discussion
If the New START verification framework cannot accommodate the expanding People's Liberation Army Rocket Force inventory without substantial restructuring, what alternative mechanism could establish strategic stability between Washington and Beijing?
The structural friction suggests that traditional on-site inspection protocols will likely give way to asymmetrical transparency measures or tacit deployment caps rather than a formal trilateral treaty.
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