By Abhijnan Rej

In a new Diplomat Risk Intelligence, five prominent experts on space issues examined — among many other key issues related to Asia-Pacific’s outer space engagement — how the space security regime, and capabilities and intent, have not tracked each other, with geopolitics and national economic aspirations introducing further complications.
Australian Strategic Policy Institute scholar Malcolm Davis writes:
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) bans the deployment or use of nuclear weapons in space. It doesn’t ban the development, testing and deployment of non-nuclear ASATs [anti-satellite weapons]. Efforts since the OST to prohibit ASATs, such as the Russian and Chinese proposals for a Prohibition on the Placement of Weapons (PPWT) in space, and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space agreement, as well as an EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space activities, have failed in part due to challenges in defining what constitutes a space weapon and challenges associated with verification and monitoring. The Russian and Chinese efforts with PPWT sought to ban co-orbital ASATs, but did nothing to constrain either direct-ascent ASATs or ground-based counterspace capabilities. Defining what constitutes a co-orbital ASAT is becoming increasingly difficult as a “grey zone in orbit” emerges due to the blurring between commercial space capability and potentially hazardous or malign rendezvous and proximity operations.
















