6 October 2026

Entangled Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

Council on Foreign Relations | Michelle Gavin

Ethiopian federal forces and Tigrayan combatants resumed high-intensity hostilities in September 2026, shattering the fragile stability maintained since the 2022 Pretoria Agreement that halted a war claiming 600,000 lives. The renewed clashes spread across Amhara and Afar regions as seven armed groups formed the Alliance for Survival to overthrow Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

External rivalries compound internal instability. Eritrea aligned with Tigrayan forces against Addis Ababa over Red Sea port ambitions, while Egypt and the Sudanese Armed Forces back insurgents against Ethiopian forces and their allies. Washington simultaneously declined to renew targeted sanctions on Ethiopian and Eritrean officials, championed closer U.S.-Eritrean ties under Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and withdrew funding from the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Deterrence collapsed across the Red Sea. These contradictory policy posture shifts leave local actors unconstrained, accelerating regional fragmentation while al-Shabaab expands security cooperation with Houthi militants along vital maritime corridors.

Comment

Eritrea's tactical realignment with Tigrayan forces demonstrates how the collapse of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement has fundamentally reordered alliances across the Horn of Africa. By abandoning its previous alignment with Addis Ababa, Asmara seeks to preempt Ethiopian territorial claims over Red Sea access near Assab. This shifts the regional balance, transforming domestic counterinsurgencies into an interconnected multi-front theater spanning from the Bab el-Mandeb to the Nile basin.

The operational mechanics of this alignment rely on cross-border logistics pipelines through Sudan, where the Sudanese Armed Forces provide sanctuary and material support to Tigrayan fighters. Concurrently, Ethiopian security cooperation with Somaliland disrupts Cairo’s maritime containment strategy, prompting Egypt to deepen intelligence sharing with Mogadishu to secure its southern flank.

Strategic Question for Discussion
Which factor poses a greater risk to maritime security near the Bab el-Mandeb — Asmara's tactical alignment with Tigrayan insurgents or Ethiopian security pacts with Somaliland?
The trajectory indicates that Ethiopian engagement with Somaliland represents the more volatile catalyst because it directly pulls Egypt and Somalia into an anti-Ethiopian coalition. While Eritrean support for Tigrayan forces degrades Ethiopian border stability, Cairo's potential military presence in Mogadishu creates a direct state-on-state friction point along vital Red Sea shipping lanes.
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