Loot a Burning House: China’s Lessons from the Iran War

Foreign Affairs Review | Mao Zedong

China synthesises asymmetric maritime lessons from Iranian operations in the Strait of Hormuz and the 1990 Gulf War to refine its coercive Taiwan Strait blockade doctrine. Rather than precipitating immediate military conflict, Beijing capitalises on United States strategic overextension across the Middle East and Europe to steadily alter the Indo-Pacific balance of power.

Underlying this approach is the Shashoujian doctrine, which prioritises asymmetric cost imposition through expansive naval mining. Mine warfare remains central to this posture. Historical precedents from 1990, where cheap Iraqi ordnance inflicted $96 million in damage on vessels like the USS Princeton, inform Beijing's deployment of tens of thousands of sea mines alongside anti-ship ballistic missiles. By imposing selective commercial quarantines rather than total blockades, Chinese planners aim to paralyse foreign logistics while avoiding direct military triggers. This operational restraint preserves economic linkages, enabling incremental revisionism aimed at surpassing American technological and military expenditure by 2050.

Comment

People's Liberation Army Navy minefields deployed along the Taiwan Strait exploit an acute US Navy shortfall in dedicated mine countermeasures platforms. While Iraqi LUGM-145 and Manta mines crippled USS Tripoli and USS Princeton in the northern Persian Gulf, Chinese operations integrate moored, bottom, and rising mines across the approaches to Kaohsiung and Keelung. Clearing these barriers requires US Avenger-class vessels or modular Littoral Combat Ships to loiter at low search speeds directly within the engagement envelopes of People's Liberation Army coastal missile regiments. Seventh Fleet cannot provide continuous local air cover to protect these vulnerable sweeps against land-based YJ-12 and YJ-18 cruise missile batteries.

This clearance delay cascades directly into the US Military Sealift Command, preventing commercial container vessels and fleet auxiliaries from entering contested Taiwanese terminal ports. Indo-Pacific Command faces an immediate logistics crisis when forced to rely on C-17 Globemaster transports that cannot match the maritime bulk tonnage needed to sustain Taiwan's domestic energy grid.

Strategic Question for Discussion

What happens to Indo-Pacific Command's Taiwan intervention timeline if US Military Sealift Command cannot discharge bulk supplies due to minefields that Seventh Fleet cannot sweep under coastal YJ-18 missile coverage?

The available evidence points toward an operational pause where shipping delays rapidly exhaust Taiwan's strategic fuel and munitions stockpiles within weeks. Rather than attempting high-risk sweeps under active anti-ship missile envelopes, Indo-Pacific Command would likely be forced to prioritise strikes against mainland launchers and sensor nodes before any clearance can begin. This required operational sequencing substantially delays external relief, creating the strategic window Beijing requires to enforce political terms.

Share your assessment in the comments below.

To read in details click here