Pakistan and Terrorism: When the Tables Turn

The Diplomat | Natiq Malikzada

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s address to the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly accused Afghanistan of hosting terrorist sanctuaries, marking a sharp escalation in bilateral tensions. Islamabad demanded the Afghan Taliban neutralize groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) operating across the border.

This diplomatic friction exposes the collapse of Pakistan's long-term strategy of cultivating regional proxy forces to project external influence. For decades, the state's intelligence apparatus nurtured networks like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which executed the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Despite domestic blowback, Islamabad maintains a selective counterterrorism posture. It continues to harbor groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed in Bahawalpur and Hizbul Mujahideen, whose leader Syed Salahuddin remained active in Pakistan as of June 2026. This double standard undermines its international credibility. Trust remains entirely broken. Genuine regional stability requires verifiable domestic action to dismantle these cross-border operational structures.

Comment

Islamabad's persistent patronage of anti-India militant groups, even while facing severe domestic blowback from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, directly shapes New Delhi's defensive posture along the Line of Control. The continued presence of Jaish-e-Mohammed in Bahawalpur and Hizbul Mujahideen networks under Syed Salahuddin demonstrates that Pakistan's security establishment separates western border threats from eastern proxy operations. This operational bifurcation ensures that India's military planning cannot rely on Pakistani domestic instability to naturally diminish cross-border infiltration. Consequently, the Indian Army's counter-infiltration grid along the Jammu and Kashmir frontier remains permanently mobilised.

This enduring threat environment forces India to sustain high capital expenditure on tactical surveillance systems and border fencing rather than fully pivoting resources toward maritime modernisation in the Indian Ocean. The financial burden of maintaining the counter-insurgency mandate in Kashmir directly limits the Indian Navy's acquisition rate for conventional platforms. Ultimately, Pakistan's selective counterterrorism policy acts as a low-cost strategic constraint that successfully dilutes the Indian Navy's long-term procurement budget for the Project-75I submarine programme.

Strategic Question for Discussion

If Pakistan's patronage of Syed Salahuddin's Hizbul Mujahideen continues to tie down Indian ground forces in Kashmir, how can New Delhi realistically reallocate its defence budget to accelerate the Project-75I submarine programme?

The persistent threat along the Line of Control suggests that India will remain locked into a capital-intensive continental defence posture for the foreseeable future. Consequently, my assessment is that New Delhi will likely delay or scale back ambitious maritime acquisitions like the Project-75I programme to ensure the army's immediate operational readiness in Kashmir. This trajectory indicates that Pakistan's proxy strategy will continue to successfully constrain India's broader Indo-Pacific maritime ambitions.

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